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ABSTRACT
Air Force sustainment operations are the focus of an intensive internal effort to
improve performance and reduce costs. Past improvement initiatives have
often failed to produce the intended results, and have caused performance to
decline in some cases. Exploratory research was conducted at an Air Logistics
Center to study how improvements are executed.
Two conclusions are drawn from this research. The first is that changing
sustainment operations is a problem of high dynamic and behavioral
complexity. The second conclusion is that system models are well suited to
coordinating change at the ALC because they provide insight into how a
complicated system can be managed and improved. Three key findings
support these conclusions. First, there is significant correlation between
categories of unavailable F-16 aircraft such that reductions in one category are
associated with increases in another. Second, an analysis of change efforts in
two parts of the ALC shows that systemic influences, such as the inability to
reinvest in improvements, are hindering change initiatives in one part of the
ALC. The third finding is that a model of sustainment operations suggests that
independent improvement initiatives are outperformed by coordinated efforts
driven with an understanding of systemic interactions.
Leaders throughout the sustainment community have expressed their desire to
understand how sustainment operations function as a system. A hybrid
approach to change is offered as a method for understanding and improving
sustainment operations. System models are used to quantify and model
system interactions; then policies and recommendations are drawn from the
models. Recommendations may include process-level improvements utilizing
change methods already in use at the ALC
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Principal Research Associate
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AFMC
ALC
BRAC
CBO
DLA
DoD
EVSMA
F-16
Flow days
GAO
IM
MC
NMCB
NMCM
NMCS
O&M
OO-ALC
R&M
REMIS
System availability
TNMCS
VSM
WCF
Acronyms:
Air Force Materiel Command
Air Logistics Center
Base Realignment and Closure
Congressional Budget Office
Defense Logistics Agency
Department of Defense
Enterprise Value Stream Mapping and Analysis
A multi-role fighter jet, also called the Fighting Falcon
The number of days it takes an aircraft or component to
complete a process.
Government Accountability Office or General Accounting
Office
Inventory Management
Mission capability, a measure of how many aircraft are
available for missions. This measure does not include
aircraft that are undergoing depot maintenance, unlike
system availability.
Not Mission Capable for maintenance and supply,
unscheduled or scheduled rate
Not Mission Capable for Maintenance, unscheduled or
scheduled
Not Mission Capable for Supply
Operations and maintenance
Ogden Air Logistics Center
Reliability and Maintainability
Reliability and Maintainability Information System
A measure of how many aircraft are available for
missions. This measure does include aircraft that are
undergoing depot maintenance, unlike MC (mission
capability).
Total Not Mission Capable for Supply, NMCS + NMCB
Value Stream Mapping
Working Capital Fund
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1 Introduction
Successful problem solving requires finding the right solution to the right
problem. We fail more often because we solve the wrong problem than
because we get the wrong solution to the right problem.
Russel Ackoff (1974)
Ackoff's observation raises a question: how do we determine the right problem?
The importance of this question cannot be overstated because the problem
shapes the solution method. Consider the apocryphal story about the owner of
a tall office building and the tenants who complained about long wait times for
elevators. Engineers proposed to add elevators, an expensive solution to the
problem. The owner decided instead to install floor to ceiling mirrors by the
elevators on each floor. Complaints dropped immediately. Tenants who used
to wait in frustration found themselves unhurriedly checking their hair, makeup,
and neckties. Engineers had framed the problem as one of moving people
between floors, while the owner focused on reducing the annoyance that caused
complaints. Different problems resulted in different solutions.
Getting to the right problem can be especially challenging when faced with a set
of interrelated or interdependent problems, or system of problems. "English
does not contain a suitable word for 'system of problems.' Therefore, I have
had to coin one. I choose to call such a system a mess" (Ackoff 1974, p21).
This thesis endeavors to show that a particular set of problems is a mess that
ought to be treated with systems methods.
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1.1 Problem statement
The focus of this thesis is a change effort underway at a United States Air Force
Air Logistics Center in Ogden, Utah. Leaders at the Center have set
improvement goals shown in Figure 16, and they intend to meet those goals as
efficaciously as possible. The overall problem is how to meet the improvement
goals with the minimum amount of resources.
This thesis advances two contentions that were stated briefly in the introduction.
First, that the change effort is system of problems with high dynamic and social
complexity, and second, that managing change through systems methods is
better than the methods in use. Support for the first contention will come from
demonstrating the interdependent nature of the change effort. Enterprise change
will be established at the upper-right quadrant of problems described in Figure
1. The second contention will be supported by addressing three questions.
Namely, when compared with the improvement prioritization methods in use,
does a systems approach...
1. ... lead to different conclusions?
2. Is it preferable?
3. How does the method influence the change process?
This thesis seeks to connect theory and practice. Every effort will be made to
link abstract notions about systems methods to the concrete problems facing
those who act in change efforts. Particular attention will be given to the scope of
influence at the Air Logistics Center in Ogden, which hosted this research.
However, this attention does not mean that the boundaries of the problem are
drawn at the Center's fence. What it does mean is that certain results will be
presented in a way that is useful to the Center leadership.
Leaders at the Air Logistics Center are one segment of the intended audience for
this thesis. Another segment is those who seek to change organizations that fall
under Ackoff's definition of a mess. This thesis may serve as a case study of
applied systems methods for such an audience.
2
Dynamic Complexity
Figure 1: Problem domains. Mess is Ackoff's term (1974), while tame
and wicked are Rittlel's (1973).
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1.2 Research methods
This thesis is based on data collected over the course of six visits to the Air
Logistics Center in Ogden, Utah. The US Air Force invited members of the Lean
Aerospace Initiative consortium to visit the center and participate in a change
planning process. As a member of the consortium the author had access to a
range of personnel at the base from the Vice Commander to technicians in
maintenance shops.
Quantitative data came from a variety of sources within the Center, including
the F-16 System Program Office, the Air Force database known as REMIS
(Reliability and Maintainability Information System), and the depot
Maintenance Wing. Qualitative data was gathered from interviews and
observations made in meetings among Center personnel. Another valuable
source of information was the significant body of work on Air Force
sustainment produced by researchers and auditors. Air Force sustainment has
been a recurring topic for RAND, the Government Accountability Office, and the
Congressional Budget Office. MIT students and researchers have produced
several Master's theses and papers on topics related to Air Force sustainment.
An exploratory approach was brought to the research. System dynamics and
statistics were used to analyze data and produce insights, but the decision to
apply these methods was made gradually over the research process, not at the
outset. The overall objective was to use methods that were appropriate for the
problem. Indeed, arriving at the problem statement was another exploratory
process. Past attempts to change Air Force sustainment have often failed to
produce the intended results, a finding that compelled the author to question
why the attempts failed, and to not take the problem definition for granted.
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2 Background
When you are confronted by any complex social system, such as an
urban center..., with things about it that you're dissatisfied with and
anxious to fix, you cannot just step in and set about fixing with much
hope of helping. This realization is one of the sore discouragements of
our century... You cannot meddle with one part of a complex system
from the outside without the almost certain risk of setting off disastrous
events that you hadn't counted on in other, remote parts. If you want to
fix something you are first obliged to understand.. .the whole system...
Intervening is a way of causing trouble.
Lewis Thomas (Thomas 1974)
Thomas describes what many call The Law of Unintended Consequences. While
this law does not have scientific validation like, say, Newton's laws of motion,
unintended consequences seem to be a feature of life just like apples falling
from trees or planets circling the sun. To avoid "disastrous events" we must
first understand what we are fixing.
This chapter provides context and support for the analysis to follow. It can be
roughly divided into halves. In the first half the operation is described: Air
Force sustainment, and, in particular, F-16 sustainment at the US Air Force
Ogden Air Logistics Center in Utah. In the second half the focus turns to
methods and techniques for understanding and changing sustainment
operations.
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2.1 Air Force sustainment overview
Air Force sustainment is one branch of the United States Department of Defense
(DoD) sustainment organization. If DoD sustainment were a company it
would be America's 8th largest with over $80 Billion in revenue in 1999. In 2000
sustainment accounted for 37% of the overall defense budget. The system has a
truly global scope because it reaches wherever there are US troops. A network
of more than 80,000 suppliers provides equipment and parts (DoD 2000).
Perhaps the best way to introduce Air Force sustainment operations is to step
through a hypothetical case that follows an aircraft through the sustainment
process. Figure 2 provides an overview that is described in a GAO report:
The process used to repair failed repairable items begins when unit
maintenance personnel at an Air Force base removes a failed item from
the aircraft. At this point, base maintenance attempts to either repair the
item or obtain a serviceable replacement from base supply. However, if
base maintenance cannot repair the item and a suitable replacement item
is not available, the base must (1) return the broken item to a
maintenance depot for repair and (2) request a replacement from the
appropriate inventory control point. The inventory control point, in turn,
attempts to find a replacement in its existing wholesale inventory. If a
replacement is not available, the inventory control point must either
acquire a new one or repair a broken one. (GAO 1999b, p. 15).
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Customer Base Base Supply DLA Warehouse DepotAircraft needs Maintenance Ships the part if Air Force Supply Maintenancea part. Removes the they have it. If Management Activity The Air Force Supplybroken pail and they don't have Group directs DLA Management Activity
orders new part it, part is ordered warehouse to Group pays to Airfrom base supply. and broken part provide items to bass Force DepotInstalls new part is sent to DLA supply. DLA also Maintenance Activity
when received. warehouse for stores broken item in Group and
storage. need of repair until contractors to fix
the Air Force Supply broken inventory
Management Activity items. Fixed items
Group determines are sent back to DLA
that the part needs to warehouse for
be fixed. storage until parts
are ordered by base
supply.
Figure 2: Sustainment operations overview (GAO 1999b, p. 16).
The operation outlined above handles a daunting array of parts and
transactions. Approximately 172,850 types of parts (also called NSNs,
National Stock Numbers) are managed, and there are over 600 million
individual transactions per year. Performance data and management
information is spread across 644 information systems. The overall response
time is 29.8 days measured from the perspective of end-users at air bases,
meaning that the wait for a requested part is approximate one month (USAF
1999).
2.1.1 Air logistics centers
Depot repair and supply management are the purview of three Air Logistics
Centers (ALCs) in Utah, Oklahoma, and Georgia. There is both sharing and
specialization in duties between the ALCs. For example, the Ogden, Utah ALC
(called OO-ALC in Air Force parlance) hosts F-16 depot maintenance and
logistics management, though some F-16 components, such as the engine, may
be processed at another ALCs. Over 13,000 air force personnel, civil servants,
and contractors work at the Ogden ALC with a majority - 70% - in the last two
categories (CTPID 2004).
The ALCs were reorganized in late 2004 so that their structure would mirror
operational wings - that is, units that fly jets. The reorganization was
7
motivated by the desire to make sustainment operations more transparent to
customers in operational wings. The previous organizational structure was
unique and not recognizable to other branches of the Air Force. A new
organization chart is shown in Figure 3. This thesis is primarily concerned with
the activities of three wings in this chart: the Aircraft Sustainment Wing, the
Combat Sustainment Wing, and the Maintenance Wing.
The Aircraft Sustainment Wing provides sustainment and acquisition expertise
for the Air Force, other federal agencies, and foreign military sales, with a focus
on components that are specific to a particular aircraft or platform. The
Combat Sustainment Wing manages supply chain operations for commodities
(e.g. nuts and bolts) and components such as landing gear and power systems.
Combat Sustainment has a $1.5 billion annual budget and more than 850 staff
members. Finally, the Maintenance Wing provides depot repair, modification,
and maintenance for the F-16 Fighting Falcon, A-10 Thunderbolt and C-130
Hercules aircraft, and the Peacekeeper and Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
The sustainment of F-16 aircraft is a topic of particular interest because this
model composes such a large part of the US Air Force inventory. F-16 aircraft
accounted for 56% of all US Air Force fighter / attack aircraft in 2000
(Bozdogan 2003). Therefore, the effectiveness of F-16 sustainment has a
significant impact on the overall sustainment operations performance. An F-16
is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 3: Organization chart for the Ogden Air Logistics Center (Wells
2004).
Figure 4: An F-16 at the Ogden Air Logistics Center.
2.1.2 Sustainment operations performance
Air Force sustainment performance is measured at a macro level by availability
(how many aircraft are fit to perform a mission) and cost. The last two decades
have seen a significant rise and fall in availability levels. Figure 5 shows that
mission capability rates for fighter aircraft (including the F-16) peaked in 1991
at over 88% before dropping to approximately 75% over the next 10 years.
More recent data from 2004 shows that F-16 mission capability levels are 78%
(USAF 2005).
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Another measure of sustainment performance is system availability, which is
similar to mission capability, but not identical. Mission capable aircraft are
counted from a pool that does not include aircraft undergoing depot
maintenance. System availability does count aircraft in the depot. Therefore
system availability rates will always be equal to or lower than mission
capability rates. System availability may be a more meaningful measure of
sustainment operations performance because it is based on the status of all
aircraft.
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Figure 5: Mission capability rate for Air Force fighter aircraft (Oliver
2001).
While availability rates have dropped over the last 10 years, costs have not.
Figure 6 shows that sustainment costs per flying hour have grown (measured in
constant year 2000 dollars). Falling labor productivity is partially to blame;
depot maintenance productivity fell 11.3% from 1992 to 1999 (GAO 2000).
Rising sustainment costs are exacerbated by the fact that less aircraft are
available for missions. There are approximately 1,350 F-16s in the US Air Force
inventory, thus the drop in availability from 1991 to 2004 effectively reduces the
number of available aircraft by 135. At 2005 prices of $35 million per plane,
this represents $4.7 billion in value. In this calculation the F-16 availability rate
was presumed to be the same as the overall fighter rate in 1991.
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The decline in availability from 1991 to 2001 shown in Figure 5 can be linked
with three major changes in the Air Force sustainment operations (GAO 2000).
First, the number of personnel in the sustainment system has been reduced in
response to declining force structures and increasing use of contractors - the
Depot Maintenance Activity Group dropped from 31,000 in 1991 to 21,000 in
1999. Second, The Air Force made a major shift in maintenance processes from
1993 to 1997 by moving from a three level operation (organization,
intermediate, and depot) to two levels (organization and depot). Third, the Air
Force closed two of the five depots from 1995 to 2000 as a part of the Base
Realignment and Closure process (BRAC). The closures caused significant
disruptions to sustainment operations.
Operation and maintenance
spending per operating hour
$8,000 86.0
$7,500 84.0
$7,000 82.0
- 80.0I $6,500 78.0
$6,000 76.0
$5,500 Mission capability rate 74.0
$5,000 i i i for major aircraft 72.0
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Force operating costs and availability (GAO
2001).
1999b) (CBO
What happens to aircraft when they are not available? Figure 7 shows how
unavailable aircraft fall into one of four categories. The first is called NMCM
(Not Mission Capable for Maintenance). When an aircraft malfunctions it is
first placed in this category. Maintenance technicians at bases will diagnose the
problem and replace parts if necessary. If the parts are not available then they
will be ordered and the aircraft will change to NMCS (Not Mission Capable for
Supply), or waiting for parts. The third and fourth categories pertain to depot
11
Figure 6: Air
maintenance. Aircraft are routinely taken out of service for planned inspection,
upgrades, and repair, not unlike an oil change for a car. This is called scheduled
depot maintenance. Unscheduled depot maintenance occurs when field
maintenance personnel are unable to repair an aircraft. Depot facilities have
greater repair capabilities than air bases. Some level of scheduled depot
maintenance is unavoidable; especially since aircraft are regularly upgraded in
the depot. Aircraft in the NMCS category can be reduced to zero in principle,
but some aircraft will always fall in the NMCM category due to required
inspections.
Waiting for parts
10%
Available
70%
Waiting for
maintenance
11%
Unavailable
30%
Unscheduled depot
Scheduled depot
8%
Figure 7: F-16 system availability, December 2003 - November 2004
(USAF 2005).
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2.2 Related work in Air Force sustainment
US Air Force sustainment does not suffer from a lack of attention. Growing
costs and declining availability performance have engendered scrutiny from a
variety of sources within the Air Force, Department of Defense, Congress, think
tanks, and academia. The following sections present a number of theses and
reports that are relevant to this thesis. Special attention is given to findings that
highlight the systemic nature of sustainment and the interrelationships between
parts of sustainment operations. The work is divided between two sections;
oversight reports and academic or analysis research. An overview of this work
will provide a recent history of Air Force sustainment along with the trends and
forces that have influenced the current conditions. These sections conclude with
a synthesis of findings from the literature.
2.2.1 Oversight reports
Oversight and analysis studies come from two sources: the General
Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). As
suggested by the office titles, these reports focus on waste, fraud, and abuse of
government resources, and budgetary oversight. These reports are valuable in
the context of this thesis because of their scope and access. GAO and CBO
inspectors are free to reach across organizational boundaries and collect data
from disparate sources. The reports are typically commissioned to investigate a
specific phenomenon and develop recommendations for action.
Unintended consequences in Air Force sustainment
In the late 1990's the persistent parts problems within the US Air Force began to
attract the attention of congress. The GAO issued a report focused on the
effects of parts problems and the root causes (GAO 1999b). The report's title
gives some indication of the findings: Management Actions Create Spare Parts
Shortages and Operational Problems.
The "operational problems" mentioned in the title were widespread. Falling
mission capability rates (see Figure 5) were just one symptom of parts
shortages. Training goals were affected as well. Pilots for F-16 aircraft flew
13
only 83% of their planned training hours in 1998, leaving some pilots without
enough training to qualify as mission capable.
Supply problems were identified as the main cause of the shortfall. Indeed, the
fraction of aircraft that is not available for missions due to supply problems
more than doubled from 1990 to 1998 as shown in Figure 8. Maintainers dealt
with parts shortages by increasing cannibalization rates - that is, the practice of
repairing an aircraft by taking parts off of a non-mission capable aircraft.
According to Figure 9 cannibalization rates more than doubled over five years.
Cannibalization is generally undesirable because the practice doubles the
workload for maintainers. They must remove a part from another aircraft
instead of pulling a ready-to-use part from a shelf. Furthermore, the removal
process may damage the part.
14
Pment of aircraft not mission
capable due to supply problmsFmc yew
1990 6.4
1991 8.6
1992 9.5
1993 10.2
1994 10.3
1995 10.8
1996 11.0
1997 12.6
1998 13.9
Source: The Ar Forcet Muht-Echelon Resource and Logistcs Informabon Network and the Rehabity
and Maintanablity Informabon System.
Figure 8: Total Not Mission Capable for Supply (NMCS) rates for
major Air Force aircraft (GAO 1999b).
Figures represent average cannibalization actions per 100 sorties flown
Fscal yew F-16 B-lB C-5
1993 5.3 55.7 37.9
1994 7.8 61.1 30.9
1995 8.4 53.5 40.5
1996 10.0 66.9 41.4
1997 12.8 93.9 45.9
1998 12.1 96.3 54.0
Source: Air Combat Command and ir Mobility Command.
Figure 9: Cannibalization rates for F-16 and other
1999b).
aircraft (GAO
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Where did the supply problems originate? The GAO examined causes on a
part-by-part basis and concluded that most problems fell into one of three
categories shown in Figure 10. A significant portion of supply problems were a
direct result of an Air Force Agile Logistics program that was, ironically,
designed to alleviate parts problems while reducing costs. Parts inventories
were cut while batch repair processes were replaced with a repair-on-demand
approach. These changes were expected to save $948 million in inventory costs
while maintaining or improving service levels. Parts budgets were cut in
anticipation of the savings. But the savings never materialized, and service
levels continued to drop. A brief history of the Agile Logistics initiative is
provided in the following section.
In addressing the causes of parts problems the GAO report touched on one of
the difficulties faced by the Air Force: "Because of the integrated nature of the
supply system there is a general interrelationship among these causes." One
manifestation of the "integrated nature" was the unintended consequences of
the Agile Logistics program: less readiness for the Air Force.
sep-br 1907 September 1906
CaeNu Percent Number Percent
Forcaing and ud ng 57 36.8 0 0.0
Agile Logistics 31 20.0 26 27.1
Untimal repar 53 342 63 65.6
Other 14 9.0 7 7.3
TOWtal 100.0 96 100.0
5Pnmviy techn e probms that tt the rehabNty of aw tnm.
Figure 10: Causes for parts unavailability (GAO 1999b).
The Agile Logistics initiative
In 1996 the Air Force sought to improve efficiency in maintenance operations by
duplicating the best practices from similar commercial operations. A group of
associated changes to sustainment operations came to be called Agile Logistics.
A glance at Figure 5 shows that mission capability rates dropped significantly
after Agile Logistics began. A GAO report focused on how the initiative was
executed in an effort to explain the drop in performance (GAO 1999a). The
report complemented a 1997 study by the Air Force Inspector General.
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One finding from the Air Force Inspector General's report was that numerous
uncoordinated changes resulted in unanticipated negative feedback:
Individual organizations within the Air Force implemented the initiatives
without the benefit of a coordinated, Air Force-wide look at how the
required changes would fit together. Such initiatives required new forms
of material management discipline that material managers were not
prepared to provide. Thus, a set of uncoordinated changes, each
producing unforeseen problems did not achieve all of the anticipated
benefits (GAO 1999a, p. 48).
Another finding was that budgets were cut in anticipation of cost savings, but
the savings never materialized. Thus operations suffered from shortages of
money and parts. This mismatch was due in part to inaccurate estimates of
cost savings from initiatives, which were generally overstated.
Culture and leadership issues were also cited as obstacles in the change process.
A passage from the GAO report describes how cultural resistance to change
impeded change efforts:
The Air Force has recognized that its corporate culture is an important
factor in whether it achieves its reengineering goals. AFMC believes that
changing the mindset of the current workforce will be a challenge because
(1) its organizations have often found change threatening and have been
unwilling to modify behavior until proposed ideas are proven, (2) the
enhancement initiatives call for organizational and process changes and
many personnel have difficulty understanding how they will be affected
and are reluctant to embrace the initiatives, and (3) essential employee
groups have not yet fully supported the implementation of the new
initiatives. (GAO 1999a, p. 30)
The Air Force Inspector General concluded that change efforts would require
strong leadership support that has characterized successful change in
commercial firms:
17
In contrast to the experience of successful commercial firms, the Air
Force initiatives will not succeed unless the leadership is committed to a
program of long-term, strategic, system-wide change and, without this
leadership, the planned logistics changes will become a few more
incremental adjustments with little effect (GAO 1999a, p. 49).
Other barriers to change included a lack of data connecting operational changes
with cost savings. In many cases the relevant cost data was not collected or
available to officials who were responsible for the change.
Aging aircraft and rising costs
A study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) addressed the "defense
spending death spiral" (CBO 2001). This phrase represents a widespread belief
held by defense experts and military leaders. According to one interpretation,
decisions in the early 1990s to reduce purchases of new weapon systems have
left the military with an aging fleet of ships, vehicles, and aircraft that are
increasingly costly to maintain. The result is a self-perpetuating cycle where
growing operation and maintenance costs depress the purchase of new weapon
systems. Indeed, operations and maintenance costs have grown at 4% per year
despite reduced flying hours and personnel numbers.
The CBO report addressed two questions: 1) does aging equipment explain the
rising operation and maintenance costs, and 2) what is the relationship between
age and sustainment costs? The answer to the first question is that aging
weapon systems cannot account completely for the increased costs. Several
other factors are at work - equipment accounts for only 20% of the operations
and maintenance budget. Other rising costs come from providing healthcare to
personnel, environmental cleanup costs, property maintenance, etcetera. As for
the second question, the CBO concludes that O&M costs rise 1-3% per year of
aircraft age (adjusted for inflation). Figure 11 shows that the average age of Air
Force aircraft has steadily risen since the Korean war. This last finding has
important implications to the F-16 sustainment work at the Ogden ALC. The
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US Air Force is not replacing F-16s, so the fleet age will continue to grow linearly
until the fighter is retired.
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Figure 11: Average age of Air Force aircraft (CBO 2001).
Parts shortages hurt readiness and morale
Parts shortages can impact readiness and maintenance effectiveness, according
to a report by the General Accountability Office (GAO 2001). This is one of
three interesting conclusions in the report. Parts shortages impact readiness by
forcing maintenance personnel to delay work and wait for parts, or cannibalize
other planes for parts. Cannibalization effectively doubles the workload for
maintainers because they must remove a part from another aircraft. This leads
to dissatisfaction and low retention rates for maintenance technicians.
According to a survey of maintainers, parts shortages were the second highest
ranking cause of job dissatisfaction. The second conclusion is that parts
shortages were caused by a variety of issues. A survey of Air Force item
managers revealed that top causes were:
1. Higher than anticipated demand for parts.
2. Delays in repair processes due to the consolidation of repair facilities.
3. Difficulties with producing or repairing parts.
4. Reliability of spare parts.
5. Contracting issues.
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The second item warrants further discussion: in 1996 two of the five air logistics
centers were closed in the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process,
resulting in significant consolidation into the three facilities that exist today.
There was still considerable disruption at the time this report was published in
2001.
Improvement programs face implementation challenges
Persistent reports of parts shortages throughout Air Force sustainment
operations resulted in another recent GAO study (GAO 2003a). Significant
findings were that the Air Force had adequate plans to address parts issues, but
implementation needed to improve. One interesting finding was that the
maintenance organization had started all of the 24 improvement parts-related
initiatives identified in 2001 while the supply organization started only 7 of 19.
The author offers an explanation for this disparity in section 4.3.3.
Implementation-related findings in the report depict an organization that is
struggling with improvement projects. Researchers concluded, "most initiatives
lacked output-related performance measures and targets". In other words, the
initiatives were not linked to performance metrics that were relevant to
stakeholders. Furthermore, the Air Force did not apply the results of a
completed initiative related to setting budgets for spare parts. The Air Force
requested $5.3 billion for spare parts in 2004 despite their own analyses
predicting a $5.9 billion requirement. Later the Secretary of the Air Force
reported a $578 million shortfall in spare parts funding, which is approximately
equal to the difference in the projected and requested totals.
Management issues contributed to implementation difficulties as well. A 2002
study from an Air Force review team consisting of retired generals and senior
executives concluded that transformation efforts had a high risk of failure
because 1) the Air Force is not clearly articulating the need for change
throughout the service, 2) top-level commitment to initiatives is not strong
enough as evidenced by schedule slippage and funding difficulties, and 3) clear
roles and responsibilities have not been set across initiatives.
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Sustainment funding is complicated by Air Force policy
Air Force depots charge fees to operational units for depot work, not unlike a
corporation. Depot fees almost doubled from 2000 to 2004. The average price
for depot work rose from $119.99 per hour to $237.84. A GAO report sought to
determine 1) why prices increased, 2) if prices charged recovered the cost of
work, and 3) if the Air Force has taken steps to improve efficiency and reduce
costs (GAO 2004). An increase in material costs accounted for about 67% of
the overall price increase. However, the Air Force has not completed an analysis
of materials expenditures so it cannot quantify the extent of increase from
individual sources.
The report revealed several interesting practices around pricing. For example,
the Air Force had intentionally set depot fees below the actual cost of work from
2000-2003. This practice was designed to ensure that customers could get
necessary work completed with the amount of funding available to them under
the budget process. In 2004 the Air Force policies changed to more closely align
prices with the cost of work. Finally, the report states that the Air Force depots
are not controlling costs effectively because there is no methodology for doing
so, and a database for sharing cost savings information between ALCs has gone
unused. The report also mentions that the working capital fund (WCF) that
supports maintenance activity was over funded by $1.3 billion, and that
congress and the Air Force would be examining alternative uses for the excess
funds.
Conclusions from the oversight reports
Several impressions are left by the oversight literature; together these
impressions form a picture of an enterprise that is not meeting stakeholder
expectations. Continued scrutiny from the CBO and GAO demonstrates that
congress is not satisfied that taxpayer resources are being used effectively.
Another impression is that efforts to improve sustainment are progressing
slowly, if at all. Some improvement efforts have created unintended
consequences that overpower the intended benefits. This is due to the
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sustainment operation's complicated, integrated nature, and to improvement
initiatives that have not been implemented effectively due to low leadership
support and a lack of measurable goals. Policy interactions add another layer
of complexity to the sustainment enterprise. At times the results of analyses
have been overlooked in favor of Air Force policy considerations. Aging aircraft
will make sustainment more difficult over time. Finally, there is a lack of a
system perspective in which interrelated objectives (high readiness, low
sustainment costs, low inventory levels, etcetera) are traded off. Indeed, a GAO
report found that the Department of Defense does not have a clear, defined
process for setting aircraft availability goals which drive these objectives (GAO
2003b).
2.2.2 Academic and analysis work
Universities and the Air Force have generated a substantial number of studies
related to Air Force sustainment. Perhaps the most significant distinction
between these studies and the oversight reports is the scope of analysis.
Oversight reports are narrowly scoped to the effective use of taxpayer dollars.
Other work may be motivated by a wider variety of considerations. The
following sections present several academic and analysis reports that are
relevant to change efforts at the Ogden ALC.
Forecasting mission capability rates and identifying influences
The mission capability rate is perhaps the most widespread measure of the Air
Force sustainment operation's performance. This rate measures the fraction of
time, on average, that an aircraft is available for a mission. A study conducted
by Air Force personnel (Oliver 2001) examined how the Air Force forecasts
capability rates. An improved forecasting method was proposed. The authors
focused on the F-16C/D variant throughout the study.
Capability forecasts are important for two reasons. First, they are used in a
variety of decisions throughout the Air Force related to allocating resources.
Therefore forecasts should be as accurate as possible. Second, forecasts may be
used as a tool to understand and influence mission capability. Current Air
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Force forecasting techniques are quite accurate, but they are projections based
on trends and funding levels that offer little insight into causal relationships.
Causality is useful to those who seek to influence capability rates.
Mission capability rates are influenced by a broad array of factors ranging from
maintenance funding levels to whether pilots are flying aggressively with high-
speed maneuvers that put great stresses on an aircraft. The multitude of
influences was arranged into six categories.
- Personnel factors relate mostly to the skill level, experience, and quantity
of maintainers.
- Environment factors include the aircraft age, mission, and overall
operational tempo of the Air Force.
- Reliability and maintainability is influenced by component failure rates,
cannibalization, etc.
- Funding can be disaggregated into levels for spare parts, contractor
logistics, operations, and the like.
- Aircraft operations refer to utilization rates, the number of missions, etc.
- Logistics operations is related to base cycle repair times, parts inventory
levels, etc.
Potential influences for each of the categories are listed in Figure 12. The
authors used regression techniques to identify the factors that had the strongest
link to availability. Data from four categories went into the analysis: personnel,
reliability and maintainability, funding, and logistics operations. Environment
and aircraft operations factors were excluded because of the difficulty in
obtaining data and quantifying these factors. Of all the remaining influences,
seven accounted for 95% of the variation in mission capability rates:
* TNMCM (total not mission capable due to maintenance) hours, a
measure of the time it takes maintainers to make an aircraft operational.
This measure does not include time spent waiting for parts.
- Cannibalization hours - the time spent removing parts from a not-
mission-capable aircraft and replacing the parts on another aircraft.
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* Average aircraft inventories.
- Four additional factors related to the quantity and experience levels of
maintainers.
Using these factors as inputs for a regression model result in a prediction error
rate of 1.9% when forecasting 7 quarters ahead.
These results must be interpreted with care. For example, concluding that
factors not on the list are unimportant would be a serious mistake. A glance at
Figure 13 suggests that mission capability is very closely tied to obligation
authority (sustainment budgets): one curve unmistakably follows the other. Yet
budgets are not among the top seven factors. What the regression analysis
provides is the fewest number of parameters that account for 95% of the
mission capability rate. A parameter that is not on the list, like budgets, can
certainly affect the capability rate, but it does so less directly than other factors
that are on the list.
What is remarkable about these seven factors is that none of them are directly
controlled by the Air Logistics Centers. However, this observation should not be
construed to mean that the ALCs have no control over mission capability. What
it does suggest is that sustainment performance is affected by a wide variety of
interrelated factors, and that the ALCs influence on mission capability should
not be considered in isolation but rather as a part of the overall sustainment
system.
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Barriers to improvement
A graduate thesis focused on barriers to ending wasteful practices within the
Air Force sustainment of F-16 avionics (Brandt 2003). The author first
identified wasteful practices by applying a lean methodology and value stream
mapping. This process lead to four overarching conclusions about avionics
sustainment:
1. There is considerable waste in the system.
2. The system has lost its customer focus.
3. There is considerable negative impact from not having spare parts
available for end-item repair.
4. The lack of information quality and visibility is impeding the flow
necessary to support a lean enterprise.
Brandt describes a variety of behaviors and practices that support these
conclusions. For example, work is prioritized with a focus on lagging indicators
(e.g. mission capability rates and backorders) and internal budget constraints.
This practice practically guarantees that workers will always be "fire fighting"
the latest parts issue instead of proactively addressing demand as it arises.
Brandt recommends prioritizing work based on actual demand data from the
field - a practice that is customer-focused.
Taken together these four conclusions depict an operation that may be difficult
to change. Some of the basic building blocks needed for improvement, like high-
quality information, are missing. The lack of customer focus may translate into
reduced motivation to improve the system and address waste.
Tradeoffs in Air Force sustainment
Another thesis focused on the tradeoffs between parts inventories, aircraft
squadron sizes, and cannibalization policy (Tsuji 1999). A variety of factors
were simulated in a model: parts inventories, cannibalization levels, depot
repair times, squadron sizes, etc. What is the optimal mix of these factors? The
answer is complicated, as it is with many questions about sustainment. Tsuji
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found that the lowest overall cost to the Air Force was achieved with small
squadron sizes and relatively high levels of spare parts. But this answer carried
a caveat: small squadron sizes reduce the ability to respond to surges in
demand for aircraft, surges that may be related to war or other events of critical
importance. Tsuji summarized his observations from the analysis as follows:
Perhaps the key point of this thesis is that it is important to consider the
systemic effects of decisions and changes in the Air Force. Making
decisions that seem to be beneficial on a local scale may in fact be
detrimental to the overall system. Well-meaning individuals or
organizations may act in a counterproductive manner if they are not
aware of their impact on the system. Furthermore, if performance
metrics are not established with overall system performance in mind,
individuals and organizations may actually be guided to act
counterproductively. Understanding systemic behavior and the impact
of decisions on the overall system is crucial.
Tsuji examined several factors that are controlled by the ALCs. For example,
depot repair time and spare parts levels had a significant impact on availability
levels. Figure 14 shows that high availability levels require low repair times at
depots and significant levels of spare parts. The tradeoff between parts
inventories and mission capability explains the drop in mission capable rates
following the Agile Logistics program. Inventories were cut, but depot repair
times were not reduced, so mission capability rates fell.
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Figure 14: The impact of spare parts inventories and depot repair
time on mission capability rates (Tsuji 1999).
Conclusions from academic and analysis work
The academic and analysis work provides techniques for understanding and
influencing sustainment operations. Understanding was built along two
dimensions. First, sustainment operation interactions were described and
predicted using simulation and regression analysis techniques. Second, lean
methods were applied in an effort to identify barriers to improving performance.
Together these findings will be useful for addressing some of the problems
identified in the oversight literature.
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3 Change at the Ogden Air Logistics
Center
This thesis endeavors to show that a particular approach to change is well
suited to complex enterprises such as the Ogden Air Logistics Center.
Questions naturally arise from such a contention. Namely, how does the ALC
execute change now? Are there examples of successful initiatives? What are the
change capabilities and barriers in the organization? The following sections
address these questions.
The author observed change processes at the Ogden ALC over the course of six
visits and numerous interviews and meetings. The following sections present
these observations with an emphasis on three topics: 1) sustainment operation
performance at the ALC, 2) methods for improving performance, and 3) change
capabilities and barriers at the ALC. These observations provide a foundation
for the analysis and recommendations in the following section.
Many of the observations were made in the context of Enterprise Value Stream
Mapping and Analysis (EVSMA), a process that began at the ALC at the end of
2003 and concluded in August of 2004. Facilitators from the Lean Aerospace
Initiative consortium joined a team of 12 leaders from the ALC in a process
designed to enable and drive lean transformation at an enterprise level.
Outcomes from the EVSMA process are described in the following section.
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3.1 Change processes
How does change happen at the ALC? Who initiates it? How are change efforts
supported? These questions can be addressed by examining change efforts,
past and present. It is useful to place the answers into the context of a process
for change, a model that describes how workers and leaders at the ALC
conceptualize and execute change processes.
3.1.1 Examples of change
Most of the change success stories emerging from the ALC come from the
Maintenance Wing where lean improvements have been ongoing since the late
1990s. In 2003, for example, the maintenance wings at all ALCs had 64
initiatives identified versus 20 initiatives for logistics operations at the centers
(GAO 2003a, p. 8). The change process in the Maintenance Wing starts with
leadership identifying a particular maintenance line or shop for improvements,
such as the generator shop or F-16 upgrade line in the depot. The initiative's
focus may be motivated by input from Air Force leadership through higher-level
organizations such as the Depot Maintenance Activity Group or Supply
Management Activity Group, which are, in turn, influenced by sustainment
customers (operational aircraft commands) and higher levels within the Air
Force and Congress. Some members of Congress are keenly aware of
sustainment performance, if the volume of reports from the General
Accountability Office and Congressional Budget Office are any indication.
There are 425 reports from the GAO containing the phrase "Air Force" and the
word "sustainment" as of May 2005.
Once a line or shop is identified the Maintenance Wing has typically hired
outside consultants for change leadership, facilitation, and expertise. The
Maintenance Wing leader, Brigadier General McMahon, described the
organization's approach: "The [Maintenance Wing's] model for facilitators is to
bring in experienced outsiders to help insiders. Those who are interested and
motivated will rise to the occasion and become the next facilitators."
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McMahon's comment alludes to a goal within the organization: to develop
insiders to lead the next round of improvements.
Experienced internal change leaders are beginning to spread across the ALC.
For example, the current director of the ALC Transformation Directorate had
experience with improvement initiatives in his previous position with the
Maintenance Wing. Indeed, the very existence of the Transformation
Directorate, established in 2003, is due to the growing number of improvement
initiatives happening across the ALC and the need to coordinate them. Lean
events are active in 65 areas at the center (CTPID 2004).
Another feature of the ALC change process is openness. No single "brand" of
improvement methodology is advocated. Other organizations, such as
Raytheon, have successfully taken the opposite approach by requiring all
initiatives to use the same methods (Hemann 2004). In an interview the author
asked McMahon if there were any difficulties with using multiple
methodologies. His response indicates a model of change that is similar to a
marketplace:
[The Maintenance Wing] has multiple approaches to change. That isn't
necessarily bad, and there doesn't have to be tension between methods.
As long as there is a closed loop then the best methods will rise to the
top and be copied by others. Synthesis occurs over time. Our experience
has been that more integration leads to more success.
The reference to a "closed loop" alludes to monitoring feedback from change
programs and using it to improve future efforts.
Some leaders within the Maintenance Wing appreciate the flexibility inherent in
an open model. For example, one manager explained that an improvement
program, if it were pushed from the top, would have met a backlash from
lower-level organizations. He added, "Thank goodness there was no one in an
ivory tower telling us how to do lean."
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3.1.2 Enterprise Value Stream Mapping and Analysis
In December 2003 twelve leaders at the ALC embarked on an enterprise-level
planning effort that concluded in August 2004. The process, called Enterprise
Value Stream Mapping and Analysis (EVSMA), follows a sequence shown in
Figure 15. EVSMA, according to the ALC commander General Sullivan, is "... a
mechanism for getting to that strategic look at how you are going to deploy lean
across the enterprise" (CTPID 2004).
The eight-step EVSMA process has four phases. The "Data Collection" phase
covers steps two through four, it is designed to identify enterprise stakeholders
(e.g. combat units that fly F-16s), set high-level objectives, and map processes
that deliver value to stakeholders. The "Current State and Future State
Visioning" phase consists of steps five through seven. In this phase leaders
map and evaluate interactions between parts of the enterprise, evaluate how
well the enterprise is meeting stakeholder expectations, and define goals for the
future. Step seven of EVSMA resulted in the goals shown in Figure 16. Leaders
want to reach these goals within 10 years. Step eight of EVSMA is the
improvement plan, in which seven high-level projects were sponsored. One of
these projects was to increase F-16 system availability in accordance with the
goals from Figure 16. System availability for the F-16 is approximately 70%
(USAF 2005); leaders want to increase this measure to 90%.
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Figure 15: Enterprise Value Stream Mapping and Analysis process
overview (Christopherson 2005, p. 6).
- Support system availability at 90% or better. System availability is
defined as the number of available items (jets, avionics assemblies, etc.)
divided by the total number of items.
- Reduce flow time by 50%. Flow time measures how long an item (jet,
avionics assembly, etc.) is under ALC control, from induction to sale.
- Support readiness at 100%.
- Reduce costs by 25%.
Figure 16: Improvement goals established at the Air Logistics Center.
While leaders participated in EVSMA a parallel training program commenced
for eleven civil servants from the ALC. A Raytheon employee with experience in
improvement initiatives trained the team, called "Black Belts" in Center
parlance, to act as change agents by analyzing data, identifying opportunities
for improvements, and leading change efforts. The Black Belt training
curriculum is shown in Figure 17.
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Many topics in the curriculum have roots in manufacturing. For example,
statistical process control tools are often used to monitor quality and detect
manufacturing problems. Quality function deployment was designed to aid
product development in Japanese shipyards. Theory of constraints was
introduced in the context of manufacturing lines, as was 6 Sigma. In each of
these cases the problem boundaries are defined as a single manufacturing
operation or product. Design of experiments techniques depend on controlled
conditions that may be difficult to impose in large-scale operations.
Skill category Topic
Process mapping
Value stream mapping
Lean Visual Controls
6 Sigma
Workplace organization
Statistical process control
Cause and effect diagrams
Statistics Design of experiments
Quality function deployment
Pareto charts
Theory of constraints Critical chain
Leading change
Organizations and leadership Integrated supply chain
Support and enabling processes
Figure 17: Training curriculum for 11 enterprise change agents at the
ALC.
The envisioned enterprise change model was that the Black Belts would use their
new skills to develop a portfolio of improvement projects designed to improve
F-16 system availability, and then leaders would choose and support projects
from the portfolio. But when this process was carried out the leaders decided
that the proposed projects, if executed, were not going to result in the
magnitude of improvement they sought. The black belts were eventually
integrated into other improvement initiatives that had been ongoing at the ALC
before and during EVSMA.
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Why did the proposed projects not meet leadership expectations? One possible
contributing factor, which will be developed by the author in section 4.4, is that
the Black Belts were using the wrong tools for the job. They were given a
problem with high dynamic and behavioral complexity (as evidenced in section
2.2) along with a toolset designed for process improvements on the scale of a
single factory or production line.
Business Diagnostic
One step of EVSMA was to perform a business diagnostic (USAF 2004)
intended to identify targets for improvement. The diagnostic was conducted at
an enterprise level, with "enterprise" taken to mean all of the activities
conducted at the facility in Ogden, Utah. One finding was that F-16 depot
maintenance operating expenses dominate costs at the ALC - it is the single
largest operating expenditure by a factor of two at least, representing roughly
30% of total ALC operating expenses. However, logistics organizations at the
ALC manage parts worth hundreds of millions of dollars, but these "flow
through" costs are not included in ALC operating expenses. Similarly, the
manpower dedicated to F-16 depot maintenance is greater than any other
division by a factor of two at least.
Another finding was that F-16 system availability was.approximately 70%.
Other parts of the ALC, such as ICBM operations, had availability greater than
90%. A clear picture emerges when system availability is combined with the
findings about F-16 operations dominating costs: Improving F-16 operations
has the most potential to impact cost, flow time, and availability goals at the
ALC. Other programs, such as the A-10 aircraft, are a significantly smaller part
of ALC operations.
The business diagnostic includes an "F-16 unavailability analysis", which shows
that unavailable aircraft fit approximately equally into three categories: waiting
for parts (TNMCS), waiting for maintenance manpower, facilities, or
equipement (NMCM), or undergoing maintenance. Data from 2003 and 2004
were compared, which showed that F-16s in the depot were reduced in 2004.
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However, the reduction was absorbed in other categories of unavailable aircraft
leaving system availability unchanged, which was highlighted in the
presentation. Three recommendations were given:
1. Conduct a business diagnostic on F-16 supply. Supply was chosen
because it impacts a high number of planes, and it influences the other
categories of unavailable aircraft.
2. Conduct a business diagnostic on maintenance later. This diagnostic
would focus on the interrelationships between F-16 program
management and aircraft awaiting maintenance (NMCM).
3. Leverage ongoing improvements in the F-16 depot maintenance
operations. Lean improvement initiatives have been underway at the
depot since the late 1990's.
The first recommendation became known as the F-16 supply diagnostic. The
maintenance diagnostic had not begun as of February 2005.
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F-16 supply diagnostic
Improvement efforts related to F-16 supply at the ALC had been ongoing when
EVSMA began. Over the summer of 2004 the Black Belts were integrated into
the existing efforts. Results from the F-16 supply diagnostic were presented to
leaders in October of 2004 (Hardy 2004). The overall approach to the
diagnostic was to collect and analyze data, categorize the root causes of
unavailable aircraft awaiting parts, and then chooses three to five targets of
opportunity for improvement efforts. Quality Function Deployment (QFD)
methods were used to rank the causes of unavailable parts for F-16s. Three
targets were identified from the analysis:
1. Improve parts forecasting accuracy.
2. Improve the production of subassemblies that are often the cause of F-
16 unavailability, such as the radar antenna.
3. Perform "proactive leveling" to set consumable supply inventories at the
base or unit level by using global data to forecast parts demand instead
of base-level local data.
A second independent analysis was performed on F-16 supply issues
(Christopherson 2005). This work resulted in conclusions that were similar to
Keller's. Christopherson focused on reducing cycle time in the F-16 radar
antenna shop. Failures of the F-16 radar antenna are consistently a top cause of
unavailability.
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Change coordination
Observations of change practices at the ALC have not revealed a structured
approach to managing the interactions between change initiatives. Leaders are
certainly aware of interactions between parts of the sustainment system (these
relationships were mentioned explicitly in the ALC business diagnostic), but no
attempts to quantify or model the interactions are evident. A de facto change
management process emerges in which initiatives are executed independently
with little emphasis given to influences on other parts of the sustainment
operations that may occur outside the ALC. The mental model implicit in this
method is that changing the ALC can be decomposed into independent
improvement initiatives. The following section describes a handful of initiatives
at the ALC.
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3.2 Islands of success
The impression left by the oversight reports from section 2.2.1 is that
sustainment operations are not improving. This impression is not entirely
accurate. Significant improvements have been made to parts of the
organization. Lean improvement initiatives began in the late 1990s and are
active in approximately 65 areas at the ALC (CTPID 2004). A few examples
are given below (Keller 2005).
- An F-16 depot upgrade program valued at over $1 billion implemented
a cellular flow line and achieved significant improvements. Flow days
dropped from 142 to 125, tows (the number of time an aircraft has to be
moved) dropped from 21 to 12, and on-time delivery rose from 93% to
100%.
- A lean project in the F-16 wing shop resulted in flow days dropping
from 64 to 32, while overtime, costs, and complaints dropped as well.
- An initiative in the gearbox shop has reduced flow days from 90 to 52
days, work in process has dropped from 46 assemblies to 21, and labor
hours have dropped from 236 hours per gearbox to 68. Annual direct
labor costs are expected to drop by $5 million.
These improvements fall under the definition of "islands of success", a term
coined by researchers examining lean improvement programs in the aerospace
industry (Murman 2002, p.117). Each of the improvements described above are
within the boundaries of a single shop or organization. However, isolated
improvements may not result in systemic improvement (such as increased
system availability) if the efforts are not coordinated, a problem that hindered
past improvement efforts at ALCs (GAO 1999a, p. 48).
A handful of cross-organizational initiatives have emerged at the ALC. One
example developed in response to a persistent problem: parts availability.
Workers in a maintenance shop were often unable to make repairs because they
did not have enough spare parts. In many cases there were enough parts on the
base, but they were not on-hand when the workers needed them. Some workers
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responded by hoarding parts at their workstations. This practice may seem to
improve the situation for hoarders, but the benefits may be mitigated by
undesirable side effects like less accurate inventory forecasting and less trust
from the logistics organization that issues parts. A new inventory system was
put in place where workers draw parts from point-of-use bins - a kanban in
lean parlance. Other workers fill the bins at regular intervals. Thus the control
of parts was shifted from the logistics organization to the maintenance
organization. The logistics organization was extremely reluctant to give up
control - a "major effort" was required to overcome concerns that parts would
be stolen.
What is encouraging about this example is that a problem stemming from a
lack of coordination between organizations was recognized and treated. What
is discouraging is the amount of effort required to build a bridge across two
organizations that 1) are located on the same base, 2) are at relatively low levels
that presumably require less authority to change, and 3) share the same leaders
at higher levels in the organization. If these three conditions are not met - if the
ALC must coordinate with an external supplier, for example - then will the
change process be even more complicated? Difficulties such as these point to
the challenges inherent with linking islands of success.
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3.3 Complexity
Sustaining Air Force jets across the globe is a complicated problem by
practically any measure. Consider the challenge faced by those who want to
improve sustainment opertions - where do they begin? The Vice Commander at
the ALC, Colonel McCasland, described the difficulties associated with
quantifying improvements: "Auditable, quantitative trails seem to evaporate.
Moving the analysis up to higher levels of the organization seems to result in
losing a grasp on quantitative performance measures." Why is analysis so
difficult? The large number of organizations and the complicated interactions
between them act as a barrier to analysis and understanding.
Some analysis methods, such as value stream mapping (VSM), have yielded
valuable insights for organizations that are much simpler than an ALC. When
VSM is applied to a complex organization like the ALC then does it still provide
insight? One leader at the ALC was skeptical: "A value stream map of a large
enterprise like the ALC requires high granularity. Is that useful? Can you VSM
the entire air force? What does that tell you?" This response suggests that the
VSM of the entire Air Logistics Center did not produce the intended insights for
at least one EVSMA participant. Another participant indicated the difficulty
with analyzing the ALC as a whole when he said, "Getting our arms around the
ALC enterprise has been slipperier than we thought."
Organizational complexity is exacerbated when organizations have different
priorities. Indeed, an EVSMA exercise designed to emphasize the
interrelatedness of organizations resulted in the opposite conclusion for one
participant, who said: "What came out of EVSMA was that there are four
separate units at the base with different goals." For example, the supply
organization is often measured by supply effectiveness, which is the fraction of
time that a part is available when it is needed. The Defense Department
acknowledges that current policies "... are generally biased towards the
purchase of low cost/high-demand items versus those critical spare parts that
would most improve mission capable rates" (GAO 2003a, p15). Purchasing
low cost / high-demand parts maximizes supply effectiveness, which is good
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for the supply organization, but it hinders aircraft availability. This example
illustrates how organizational complexity and miss-aligned goals can result in
lower performance.
An additional layer of complexity is introduced when multiple changes are
executed at the same time. The ALC is currently undergoing "the most
turbulent time we can recall," according to several veterans with over twenty
years at Ogden. Indeed, approximately 65 lean initiatives are active at the base
(CTPID 2004). Changes at the base level are complemented by changes at
higher levels. The Vice Commander at the ALC, Colonel McCasland, described
2005 as "a volatile year in the Department of Defense." Major changes are
expected to come from the wing reorganization (which all ALCs underwent), the
Quadrennial Defense Review, and the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
process. As the name implies, BRAC could potentially result in the realignment
or closure of the Ogden ALC. Preliminary BRAC results announced in May
2005 indicate that the ALC will lose 423 civilian positions and gain 278 military
(DoD 2005).
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3.4 Non-market forces
"The Air Force cannot do things that a corporation can do, like prioritize or do
marketing. The Air Force is not a market-driven organization." This statement
from a leader at the Center points to an important distinction between the ALC
and a corporation. A variety of non-market constraints are imposed on the
Center. The comment about prioritization points to the fact that the ALC must
accept work from the Air Force, no matter how onerous or under funded the
work may be. Contrast this with corporations that can leave markets if
conditions are not favorable.
Workforce practices represent another non-market force. Suppose that leaders
at the ALC wanted to cut costs by reducing the workforce. Doing so would be
extremely difficult. One Air Force official recalled that a proposal to
temporarily furlough workers at the ALC resulted in a phone call from a
concerned Congressional representative. Indeed, the ALC is the largest
employer in Utah with approximately 13,000 workers and a payroll over half a
billion dollars (GlobalSecurity.org 2002). Workforce reductions would be
resisted by a variety of constituencies including local businesses and
governments. Strong resistance is a frequent response to base realignments and
closures (Cahlink 2004).
Workforce practices within the Air Force may devalue the efficient use of labor.
For example, a database of improvement initiatives did not include metrics
related to the amount of labor hours invested. When asked about this omission,
an Air Force officer explained that the service did not view labor hours in that
context. He added, "According to the Air Force I'm free." However, a
counterexample to this view was provided by a leader who explained that a
fixed number of people were assigned to his organization. His objective was to
make the best use of that number, a view that emphasizes efficiency.
Non-market forces influence improvement efforts at the ALC by constraining
solutions and flexibility. If efficiency is improved and costs are reduced, for
example, regulations may prevent the savings from being reinvested into more
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improvements. Funding levels are closely monitored, which prevents the ALC
from building up a financial surplus. One example of this oversight pressure
occurred in 2003 when Congress criticized the depots for having excess funds
(GAO 2004). Section 3.6 provides more information about funding constraints
at the ALC.
A discussion about market and non-market forces within the Air Force raises
several questions: should the Air Force emulate corporations? How should the
Air Force measure value when profit is prohibited? Leaders in sustainment
operations are keenly aware of such questions. The commander of the
Maintenance Wing, Brigadier General McMahon, summarized his view when he
said, "Some people in the Air Force worry about becoming too business-like.
But I do not see that as a negative result if readiness is the goal instead of
profit."
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3.5 Leadership turnover
In December 2003 a group of twelve leaders at the Ogden ALC began the
EVSMA process. By the time the exercise concluded in August 2004
approximately half of the leaders had changed, an annualized turnover rate of
67%. Frequent rotations are a fact of life in the Air Force. According to one
leader, "Air Force culture is to take the hill, plant your flag, and move on." In
other words, sustained effort on long-term problems or change is not
emphasized. An officer in a new position who expects to move on within two
years may have little incentive to engage problems that cannot be addressed on
a timescale measured in quarters.
Major General Sullivan, who assumed command of the ALC in July 2003, spent
his first 75 days "... looking at my center before I set a direction for the
organization" (CTPID 2004). If leaders of complex organizations do not take
the time to learn then they risk misunderstanding their challenges, making
matters worse, and not understanding their effect. In a humorously titled
paper, "Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's
Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments", Kruger et al.
established that people who are unskilled suffer a dual burden: they make
erroneous decisions, and they lack the meta-cognitive ability to realize it (Kruger
1999). This problem afflicts people of all abilities because the term "unskilled"
is highly contextual. Clever, hard-working people can be unskilled in certain
domains - the moniker should not imply stupidity or laziness. Thus leaders at
the ALC who take on complicated problems may have to dedicate their time to
understanding and learning before they take action. Indeed, 75 days is 10% of a
two-year tenure.
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3.6 The color of money within the Air Force
The "color of money" refers to restrictions on how money is used. For example,
the Sustainment Wing at the ALC may receive dollars for parts (call these
purple) and dollars to pay worker salaries (call these silver). Parts of the ALC
are prohibited, by law, from using the funds for other purposes. Silver money
cannot pay for parts, no matter how under funded the purple account is. The
governing laws are sufficiently complicated that an Air Force Captain at the
ALC was going to "learn about all the colors of Air Force money" over a six-
month rotation focused exclusively on this topic.
Purple, silver, and other colors are apportioned in a budgeting process called the
Programming, Planning, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Some researchers
contend that PPBS, which was enacted in the 1960's, has formed "a defense
establishment culture that embodied inflexibility, bureaucratic complexity, and
risk-averse behavior" (Murman 2002, p42). During a meeting in January of
2005 the Vice Commander at the ALC, Colonel McCasland, described the
process:
Currently [the Defense Department is] finishing their fiscal year 2007
budget. Fiscal year 2006 is being approved higher up the chain, and
Fiscal year 2005 is already written into law. PPBS has a three to four
year lag. Since funds are appropriated they have specific uses
prescribed. For example, parts money cannot be shifted to other areas of
need. Money saved cannot necessarily be reinvested in the organization
or returned to the customer.
This description carries at least three critical pieces of information. First, there is
a long delay between when funds are allocated and when they are spent.
Projections are used to anticipate the demand and set budgets. But the
projections may not match the real demand three to four years in the future.
For example, the number one cause of parts shortages for F-16 engines in 2000
was projections that were lower than actual demand (GAO 2001, p15).
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The second point from this statement is that money cannot be shifted between
funds. This practice can cause operational problems because overall
effectiveness will be limited by the worst-performing segment of the
sustainment operation. Consider an example where parts budgets are under
funded while labor budgets have excess funds, relative to demand. If money is
unrestricted then operational penalties can be reduced by shifting money
between funds. The worst-performing segment can be mitigated. Conversely,
color of money restrictions prevent this rebalancing.
The third point focuses on the last part of McCasland's statement, that money
saved cannot be re-invested. This statement does not apply to the entire ALC.
The Maintenance Wing uses a Working Capital Fund. Unlike other wings at the
ALC that receive appropriated, colored funds through Congress, the
Maintenance Wing is paid by other organizations to fix jets and components.
However, once the money goes into the Wing's Working Capital Fund it loses its
color. McCasland elaborated on this point when he compared appropriated,
colored money with the Working Capital Fund: "Contrast this with the
Maintenance Wing, which can make short-term investments because its money
is more fungible. [The Maintenance Wing] charges customers for sales into the
WCF, which is set up to allow operations more like a business."
The Maintenance Wing's improvement efforts are significantly more advanced
than efforts at other divisions in the ALC. Could this difference have anything
to do with the Maintenance Wing having more spending flexibility? The answer
is yes according to the commander of the Maintenance Wing, Brigadier General
McMahon. When asked about the disparity he attributed the performance
difference to three factors: 1) the nature of work performed within each
organization, 2) more spending flexibility within the maintenance wing, and 3)
the maintenance wing leadership's personal investment in lean and their
willingness to take risks.
Points 1 and 3 will be addressed in section 4.3.3, but for now the focus is on
point 2, that spending flexibility aids improvement efforts. The Working
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Capital Fund provides enough leeway for the Maintenance Wing to make
improvements, reduce costs, and then re-invest the savings in more
improvements. Re-investment creates a self-sustaining feedback loop that
supports continual improvement. Indeed, a study of improvement efforts, both
successes and failures, found that a key distinction between them was re-
investment and the creation of self-sustaining positive feedback (Keating 1999).
Another difficulty arising from the budgeting process is that organizations have
little incentive to make investments that benefit all organizations. A RAND
report described how the disincentives arise:
[Air Force programming policy] makes the PPBS process feel like a zero-
sum game. Each player looks for a way to extract whatever it can, from
beyond its assigned budget constraint, to support its program. In such
a setting, it is natural to expect an operating command to look for a free
ride on the investments it hopes others will make in the common assets
that build scale economies. Unfortunately, no one has an incentive to
invest. It is natural for operating commands and AFMC to point fingers
at each other, seeking to induce the other party to invest to improve its
own performance... The result is the Air Force has a great deal of
difficulty achieving consensus on an internally consistent plan of PPBS
roles and responsibilities... Investments in spares, test stands, and
central control mechanisms that could benefit many players
simultaneously are particularly at risk. (Camm 2003, p 39)
Camm has described a 'tragedy of the commons' in which there is incentive to
take as much as possible from the system, but there is no incentive to make
improvements that benefit all.
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3.7 Compliance culture
During a tour of maintenance shops at the ALC the tour guide described the
last week's activities - inspections - with a note of frustration in his voice.
Work had stopped completely to allow a government-mandated weeklong
inspection at the facility. Auditors interviewed shop workers, and their
questions were focused solely on regulatory compliance. According to a
manager, "No one ever asks if your performance is good, just if you're
complying with regulations."
"Compliance culture" is a term coined by a veteran civil servant at the Ogden
ALC. The phrase grew from his experience with improvement projects within
several maintenance shops. Compliance culture is characterized by an inward-
looking perspective. Satisfying the demands of the bureaucracy override other
considerations like customer needs or value. An example of compliance culture
in action can be found in certain government promotion practices where civil
servants may be placed in charge of improvement initiatives based on their
seniority without regard to ability.
This inspection example suggests how compliance culture is supported at the
ALC. Compliance culture may be a response to the oversight pressures that are
attached to government funding. One leader underscored the pressures when he
said, "The Air Force is constantly tracked and monitored." Oversight often
focuses on micromanaging costs in such a way that de-emphasizes value to the
customer (Murman 2002, p.82). Complying with the regulations can be
onerous, which is why some companies (e.g. Pratt and Whitney) minimize the
negative impacts by maintaining separate divisions for government and
commercial work.
Compliance culture is inherently incompatible with lean culture, which has been
characterized as a "community of scientists" (Spear 1999). Lean culture
emphasizes strong ties to customers and a continual improvement process
based on data-driven experimentation. These two concepts are completely
foreign to the value system associated with compliance culture. According to
one ALC leader, "The organization is not used to making data-driven decisions
since money has been plentiful. But it isn't any more."
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The rift between compliance culture and lean is a barrier to transformation at
the ALC. One project leader highlighted the importance of culture when she
described her experience: "Culture is 75% of the challenge in transformation".
Another manager described how an improvement team was hampered by a few
workers who were perfectly content with the status quo. They resisted changes
at every opportunity. The manager added, "It's just going to take time to get
those people out of the system."
Resistance to change is not exclusive to workers. Mid-level managers sometimes
resist change, also. A manager of several lean improvement efforts explained
that his first lean project took 18 months to implement when it only should have
taken 6. The delay was caused by "managers [who] never got on board."
Workers and higher-level leadership supported the initiative, but without
middle-manager support progress was slow. Why would managers resist
change? One leader explained that the history of initiatives at the ALC has been
"the flavor of the month." Past initiatives have included Theory of Constraints,
SPC, QP4, etc. The leader continued: "Managers think they can outlive
initiatives if they're stubborn. I try to convince them that it's worthwhile to
change. I try to get them to see the benefits of lean."
Two organizations at the ALC, the brake and wing shops, provide an example
of successful cultural transformation. These organizations exhibit "pull", which
is the endogenous desire to change. According to one shop employee, "We
would still do lean even if it were not the flavor of the month." Consultants
who ran initiatives in these shops emphasized the interesting and fun aspects of
transformation. Evidence of their success came from envious workers in nearby
shops who wanted their own improvement initiatives. Additional evidence
came from customers - F-16 wings. Satisfaction surveys showed a significant
upward trend corresponding with the lean implementations, and the
improvements were strong enough to elicit compliments from an Air Force
General.
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3.8 Conclusions from change efforts
Change efforts at the ALC must overcome several barriers. The inherent
complexity in sustainment operations makes analysis and learning difficult.
Non-market forces such as inflexible labor practices constrain potential
solutions. The long-term, continual support for change initiatives may be
eroded by high leadership turnover. Financial policies may prohibit the
reinvestment of funds saved by improvements or encourage organizations to
compete for resources rather than cooperate on shared problems. Finally,
cultural resistance to change has built up in parts of the ALC.
Examples of successful change at the ALC prove that some of these barriers
have been overcome. But these examples represent islands of success, not
necessarily transformation on the scale of the entire ALC. Furthermore, the
question of whether a change was successful must be evaluated in context. If a
shop has reduced flow time by 50% does that necessarily contribute to the
overall objectives such as reduced costs or increased system availability? What
if the increased output from the shop is absorbed by other parts of the
sustainment process so that overall performance is unchanged? Answering
such questions at the ALC is difficult because change initiatives seem to be
managed independently without a view of the overall impacts from changes.
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4 System models as an approach to
change for complex enterprises
"There is some difficulty at the [Air Logistics Centers] in moving from data to
specific actions and projects. [Center personnel] need to get their arms around
the ALC." Robert Connor described a recurring challenge in enterprise change at
the Centers. Connor is familiar with change efforts at each of the three Centers
due to his role as Executive Director of the Air Force Materiel Command, a
parent organization to ALCs (Connor 2005). Leaders at the Ogden ALC echo
Connor's sentiments. According to the Vice Commander at Ogden, "Moving the
analysis up to higher levels of the organization seems to result in losing a grasp
on quantitative performance measures."
Daunting complexity at the Center, described in sections 2.2 and 3, acts as a
barrier to understanding and quantification. Indeed, change at the ALC fits
Ackoff's definition of a mess, or system of problems (1974, p. 21). Making this
distinction is essential because solution strategies naturally follow from the way
a problem is conceptualized. If our mental model of the problem does not
match reality then we risk wasting our efforts by trying to solve the wrong
problem. A side effect is that we make the problem harder. King elaborates
this point:
A primary danger in mistaking a mess for a tame problem is that it
becomes even more difficult to deal with the mess. The simplest of
examples illustrates this point. Asking which of your teenage kids
started the argument mistakes a mess for a tame problem. Trying to
tame the problem by blaming one of them usually makes things worse
(1993, p. 107).
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4.1 Solving the right problem
A team of change agents at the ALC - "Black Belts" in Center parlance - have
approached the ALC performance targets with a toolset rooted in
manufacturing, which was described in section 3.1.2. Implicit in this approach
is an assumption that the necessary changes can be decomposed into a series of
independent process improvements. In other words, enterprise change is a tame
problem that can be stated as follows: find and remove waste and variance
from individual processes until the goals are met.
But changing the ALC is a problem with high dynamic and behavioral
complexity. Numerous examples from sections 2.2 and 3 demonstrate dynamic
complexity with feedback and unintended consequences, while behavioral
complexity arises from the need to manage competing agendas and change
culture at the center, not just processes. Recognizing that change is a mess
results in an alternative statement of the problem: enterprise change at the ALC
entails optimizing a system of interrelated processes. Changes cause feedback
and tradeoffs. We should seek to understand the interactions among parts of
the system, quantify the tradeoffs, and then introduce a set of changes that
satisfy ALC goals while resulting in the most favorable tradeoffs.
The following section provides a framework for approaching the problem in its
alternative statement, including methods for understanding interactions and
quantifying tradeoffs.
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4.2 Analysis methods
Tame problems and messes should not be treated in the same way, according to
King. He contrasts how the two problems are treated and offers suggestions for
where to focus attention:
Problems which cannot be solved in relative isolation from one another
form messes... Rather than simply breaking things down into parts and
fixing components, we examine patterns of interactions among parts.
We look for patterns such as vicious and virtuous circles, self-fulfilling
and self-defeating prophecies, and deviation-amplifying feedback
loops... Messes demand a commitment to understanding how things
going on here-and-now interact with other things going on then-and-later.
(1993, p. 106)
King advocates treating messes systemically, not in isolated components.
Taking this view not only changes how problems are approached, it also
changes how we learn from our efforts. The "commitment to understanding"
described by King requires that we use information to inform our decisions
while we simultaneously test our mental models for how components of the
system interact. Sterman describes this learning process:
The development of systems thinking is a double-loop learning process
in which we replace a reductionist, narrow, short-run, static view of the
world with a holistic, broad, long-term, dynamic view and then redesign
our policies and institutions accordingly. (2000, p. 18)
The double-loop learning process is illustrated in Figure 18. Feedback from the
real world is used to inform decisions and test mental models of how the world
works. Forrester stresses that all decisions are based on models, usually mental
models (1961). In a double-loop leaning process information is integrated on
two levels: it informs decisions, and it changes our mental models. But models
also influence how we interact with the environment. Consider the cartoon in
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Figure 19. The pilot's mental model is influencing how he interprets what he
sees in front of the airplane.
ALC leaders talked about the difficulty in turning data into decisions in section
3.2 and in the introduction of section 4. A systems thinking approach using
double-loop learning has the potential to close the gap between data and action.
Two methods are offered by the author for integrating information into
decisions and testing mental models: statistics (more specifically, regression and
correlation) and system dynamics. These methods are not among the tools used
by change agents at the ALC shown in Figure 17, which is not surprising
because the techniques are intended for solving different problems.
Real World
Information
Decisions Feedback
Strategy, Structure, Mental Models
Decision Rules of Real World
Figure 18: Double-loop learning, named by Argyris (1985) and
illustrated by Sterman (2000, p. 19).
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"Say... What's a mountain goat doing way
up here in a cloud bank?" © Gary Larson
Figure 19: Mental models influence our perception of information
and decisions.
4.2.1 Finding interactions with regression and
correlation
Regression is a statistical technique for quantifying the relationship between
variables and estimating future values. Regression is probabilistic, not
deterministic, so the relationships between variables are subject to uncertainty.
The basic framework of a multiple linear regression model is shown in Figure 20.
Independent variables are related to a dependent variable with slope
parameters, which are chosen in such a way that minimizes the error between
data and the regression model.
y = 0+,31X1 +02X2+03X3+---+f
y Dependent variable
03, Regression slope parameter
xn Independent variable
E =Unobserved stochasticity
Figure 20: Multiple linear regression model.
57
Note that the selection of dependent and independent variables is completely up
to the investigator. Regression techniques make no distinction between cause
and effect; it focuses on correlation. For the purposes of this thesis the
dependent variable will be one of the metrics defined in the ALC goals: cost,
schedule, and availability.
Oliver developed a regression model to estimate F-16 mission capability (2001).
His aim was not forecasting, however. The Air Force has an accurate
forecasting model called FAMMAS (Funding/Availability Multimethod
Allocator for Spares), which predicts the likelihood of a spare part being
available when needed. As the title suggests, the model is based on spare parts
funding levels. Oliver described some limitations to the model:
While FAMMAS is an effective tool for predicting [mission capability]
rates, it does not adequately consider other significant factors besides
funding. Furthermore, it does not identify potential cause-and-effect
relationships that might be manipulated to affect future [mission
capability] rates; it just projects trends into the future. (2001, p. 3)
Oliver's goal was to build a model that predicted F-16 mission capability with
additional factors that may have a more direct, causal relationship with
capability. Stepwise regression techniques were used to identify influential
factors, which were selected from a set of factors shown in section 2.2.2, by
selectively adding and removing factors from the model. The most influential
factors included cannibalization rates, the number of aircraft awaiting
maintenance work (NMCM rate), the number of aircraft in the inventory, and the
quantity and experience level of aircraft technicians. Further analysis on these
factors may suggest where causal relationships exist. Russel (2000) conducted
such an analysis by applying causal modeling techniques in which hypothetical
models are tested against less restrictive models. His analysis showed that
cannibalization is strongly associated with mission capability in a way that
suggests a causal relationship. Russel's causal model was based on regression
and correlation analysis. Oliver and Russel used similar data sets for their
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analyses, but neither used data from depot operations such as the number of
aircraft in the depot over time.
Correlation is similar to regression in that it quantifies the relationship between
variables. The strength of the relationship is characterized by a correlation
coefficient, which is a measure of the linear relationship between variables.
Coefficient values range from -1 (variables move in opposition) to zero (no
linear correlation) to 1 (variables move together). Independent (or unrelated)
variables will have a correlation coefficient of zero.
Correlation was applied to sustainment by Keating (2002), who made an
unintuitive discovery: Air Force fighter jet operation costs were negatively
correlated with operational tempo. In other words, flying fighter jets more was
associated with lower operational costs. A potential explanation was offered
with the help of more correlation analysis. Keating also observed that transport
aircraft operation costs rose with higher operational tempo, as expected. Fighter
and transport tempo rates were positively correlated, also as expected.
Transport aircraft tend to have less spare parts inventories than fighter aircraft.
Taken together these points lead to a hypothesis: that transport aircraft
consume proportionally more resources when tempos are high, which leaves less
resources for fighter aircraft in a zero-sum sustainment operation. Keating
elaborates:
... [A transport aircraft depot repair] demand surge (perhaps caused by
a higher operational tempo) will run through the available spares more
quickly than a proportional surge in combat aircraft [depot repair]
demands. Any additional demands will cause "holes" in aircraft, called
mission capability (MICAPs) failures, which receive higher priority in
both depot repair and transportation functions than other demands. If
demands increase in response to a forcewide operational tempo surge,
the combat aircraft will experience relatively fewer MICAPs than
[transport] aircraft and more of the available [depot] repair capacity will
be devoted to the cargo and other support aircraft. This workload
emphasis shifts because the [supply group] and the [depot group] work
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with fixed overall budgets, and so can only reallocate workload to
minimize the worst effects of a demand surge (2002, p. 26).
This complex behavior provides yet another example of feedback and
unintuitive dynamics in the sustainment system.
Correlation and regression are useful in the context of Air Force sustainment
because they can indicate interrelationships at a macroscopic level. Further
analysis at a detailed level may support or negate the indicated
interrelationships. Macroscopic metrics like mission capability depend on the
interactions of hundreds of processes that may confound deterministic analyses.
Statistical methods offer an alternative analysis method.
4.2.2 Understanding feedback and causation with
system dynamics
Many of the problems we now face arise as unanticipated side effects of
our own past actions. All too often the policies we implement to solve
important problems fail, make the problem worse, or create new
problems. Effective decision making and learning in a world of growing
dynamic complexity require us to become systems thinkers - to expand
the boundaries of our mental models and develop tools to understand
how the structure of complex systems creates their behavior (Sterman
2000, p. vii).
Sterman offers system dynamics as a worldview and a method for approaching
problems exhibiting dynamic complexity. As a worldview system dynamics
emphasizes complex interactions that may form barriers to learning or cause
unintended consequences. As a method system dynamics emphasizes the use
of models and causal loop diagrams to describe and test mental models. The
method is highly interactive and iterative. Models are easily displayed and
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communicated, allowing others to become involved in the modeling and learning
process.
This thesis is certainly not the first application of system dynamics to Air Force
sustainment. Bickel used the method to analyze purchasing and supply chain
management of F-100 engines, the main engine of the F-16 and F-15 aircraft
(2003). Bickel's conclusions give some indication of the potential scope of
system dynamics. He recommends a dramatic reduction in the number of
contracts per supplier, and an increase in supplier development efforts from the
Air Force to improve process efficiency and reduce transactional costs. Policy
recommendations such as these may not arise from analyses that constrain
problem boundaries to single domains such as economics or engineering, or
single organizations such as the Air Force or suppliers. In the system dynamics
worldview problem boundaries are continually tested and expanded to include
influential factors.
Basic elements of system models and causal loop diagrams are shown in Figure
21. In the upper right part of the Figure the relationship between cause and
effect is indicated with an arrow. A stock and flow structure is shown on the
upper right side of the Figure. Stocks can represent quantities that accumulate
or dissipate over time. For example, a bathtub is a stock where the faucet
regulates inflow and the drain regulates outflow. The bottom of the Figure
shows reinforcing feedback - more chickens result in more eggs that result in
more chickens - and balancing feedback where interactions tend to mutually
cancel one another. Reinforcing loops are denoted with an R, while balancing
loops use B. Plus (+) and minus (-) signs on arrows indicate whether the
parameters move together or in opposition. For example, more chickens result
in more eggs, so the arrow connecting chickens and eggs has a plus (+) sign.
More road crossings result in fewer chickens, so this arrow has a minus (-) sign.
These basic building blocks can be combined to represent complex systems and
interactions.
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The dynamic behavior of complex systems is often dominated by feedback
loops. System dynamics is useful for identifying feedback loops and designing
policies that exploit them.
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Cause and effect
+
Chickens R Eggs
Reinforcing feedback
A
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Stock
Inflow Outflow
Stock and flows
Chickens. B ) Crossings
Balancing feedback
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Time Time
Figure 21: Elements of system dynamics models and causal loop
diagrams.
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4.3 Hypotheses
When regression, correlation, and system dynamics are applied to change at the
ALC then what is the outcome? Three hypotheses are developed and supported
with these methods, observations from the ALC, and findings from the
literature.
4.3.1 Is system availability conserved?
Conservation is a term that has a special meaning in science. It is applied to
measurable properties that cannot change over time. Consider the motion of a
satellite around the earth, for example. The satellite's kinetic energy (speed) and
potential energy (altitude) may change continuously, but the satellite's total
energy, the sum of potential and kinetic energy, remains constant. The total
energy is conserved.
In science conservation is not a product of coincidence but a consequence of
immutable laws of physics. The question about system availability being
conserved is intended to draw attention to an observation: F-16's seem to move
between different categories of non-mission capability, but the overall system
availability rate changes very little. Consider the data in Figure 22. For a six-
month period, from November 2003 to April 2004, the system availability rate
is practically constant. But the mix of F-16's is changing significantly over this
same time period. For example, from February to March the number of aircraft
in the depot rose by 21. However, aircraft awaiting parts (TNMCS) and
maintenance (NMCM) fell by 7 and 13, respectively, leaving the total number of
available aircraft almost unchanged. Before November 2003 and after April
2004 there is more significant variation. The gap between the minimum and
maximum values of system availability is 2.5%.
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Figure 22: F-16 system availability rates and non-mission capable
aircraft.
Correlation analyses using these data result in the correlation coefficients shown
in Figure 23. Only two of the correlations are statistically significant at a
confidence level greater than 95%: the correlation between aircraft awaiting
maintenance (NMCM) and scheduled depot maintenance, and the correlation
between aircraft awaiting parts (TNMCS) and aircraft awaiting maintenance
(NMCM).
Supply Maintenance Depot -Category (TNMCS) (NMCM) Scheduled
Maintenance (NMCM) 0.591 *
Depot - Scheduled -0.322 -0.630 *
Depot - Unscheduled 0.201 0.426 -0.122
Note: * indicates that the correlation is statistically significant at a >95%
confidence level.
Figure 23: Correlation between categories of unavailable F-16
aircraft, September 2003 - September 2004.
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These data suggest two interactions. First, there is a negative interaction
between the number of aircraft undergoing scheduled depot maintenance and
the number of aircraft awaiting maintenance (NMCM). These two categories
move in opposition since their correlation coefficient is negative. Second, there is
a positive interaction between the number of aircraft awaiting maintenance
(NMCM) and the number of aircraft awaiting parts (TNMCS). These two
categories move together since their coefficient is positive. Claims regarding
causation, like depot work causes lower NMCM rates, cannot be supported
with these data because correlation cannot prove the existence of causation.
Taken together these two correlations show how changes in aircraft awaiting
parts or maintenance tend to be absorbed by changes in aircraft undergoing
depot maintenance. This behavior is consistent with an operation in which
system availability is conserved. A recommendation naturally emerges from
these findings: quantify and model the interactions between parts of the
sustainment operations. Understanding these correlations is critical to raising
the F-16 system availability rate because at least two categories of unavailable
jets must be reduced in order to meet the system availability goals. The
following section presents a hypothetical explanation for how this correlation
arises.
4.3.2 Does local optimization result in lost
performance?
Local optimization refers to improving one part of a system without regard to
the overall performance of all of the parts. For example, the Defense
Department acknowledges that current parts procurement policies "... are
generally biased towards the purchase of low cost/high-demand items versus
those critical spare parts that would most improve mission capable rates"
(GAO 2003a, p15). Purchasing low cost / high-demand parts maximizes
supply effectiveness, a measure of how often a part is available when needed.
This is good for the supply organization because supply effectiveness is
considered a key metric, but it hinders aircraft availability.
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A model was developed to test whether changes to the F-16 supply and depot
operations result in the expected benefits to F-16 system availability. The
model, shown in Figure 30, is designed to replicate two of the correlations
described in the last section. Segments of the model and the underlying
assumptions are described in the following sections.
Aircraft in the depot
The number of aircraft in the depot is regulated by two rates: "Depot Induction
Rate" and "Fix Rate: Depot", as shown in Figure 24. Aircraft move from the
depot, into the pool of mission capable aircraft, and back into the depot over
time. This loop is designed such that the number of aircraft in the depot is
independent of other parameters in the model. In reality depot maintenance is
scheduled by the Air Force, and it is driven by the need to upgrade or overhaul
aircraft. Depot improvements that reduce flow days (the amount of time
aircraft are in the depot) will increase the "Fix Rate: Depot" parameter and
reduce aircraft in the depot.
Mission
Jets in Depot 4 Capable
Depot dStep Start - Fix Rate: Jets
Induction Rate dtpEd-W eo
d~tep End ~ eo
dStep Magnitude
Figure 24: Jets move between the depot and the pool of mission
capable jets.
Jets awaiting maintenance
The number of jets awaiting maintenance is regulated by the rate at which
aircraft break, the "Break Rate: Maintenance" parameter, and the rate at which
aircraft are repaired, the "Fix Rate: Maintenance" parameter, as shown in Figure
25. In the model the break rate is proportional to the number of mission capable
jets; thus more jets result in more breaks. How would such behavior arise? It
would naturally occur if the amount of flying hours changed with the amount
of aircraft on base.
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This assumption may not be realistic when the demand for flying hours is
completely fulfilled. The Air Force plans flying hours with considerations such
as training needs and mission needs. If all planned flying hours are achieved
then extra aircraft may be unused. However, if the demand for flying hours is
unmet due to a shortage of aircraft then adding more aircraft will result in
increasing flying hours and break rates.
A former F-16 mechanic offered an explanation for how the break rate could be
proportional to the number of aircraft available even when allflying hour demand
is met. Mechanics regularly perform inspections and other preventative
maintenance during lulls in activity so that surges in flying hours cause fewer
breakdowns. Indeed, the number one cause of aircraft awaiting maintenance is
inspections (USAF 2005).
Three more pieces of evidence corroborate the link between the number of
mission capable jets and the NMCM break rate. Oliver's regression analysis
found that the number of aircraft on base was highly correlated with mission
capability rates (Oliver 2001). This finding suggests that putting more aircraft
on base depletes limited resources: the supply of parts and labor. Second, the
correlation analysis from 4.3.1 shows that the quantity of jets in the depot is
negatively correlated with jets awaiting maintenance. If there are fewer jets in
the depot then there are more at bases, and if there are more jets at bases then
there is more work for maintainers and higher NMCM rates. Third, Russel's
causal model established a "resource use penalty" in which increasing the rate
at which jets are repaired also increases the rate at which they are used, a
balancing feedback mechanism (Russell 2000, p. 121) which is duplicated in this
model.
The rate at which aircraft are repaired is proportional to the gap between target
NMCM aircraft and the actual number of NMCM aircraft. This formulation
allows, in a simplistic manner, for the effort of workers to match demand. In
reality overtime is used to increase productivity. The "B" encircled by an arrow
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in Figure 25 indicates a balancing feedback mechanism: the fix rate adjusts to
meet demand.
Mission
Capable Jets
MaintenanceFx
Maintenance Maintenance
NMCM Target MCM Gap
Figure 25: Jets awaiting maintenance.
Jets awaiting supply
The stock of jets awaiting supply (or parts) is regulated by two rates: "Break
Rate: Supply" and "Fix Rate: Supply" as shown in Figure 26. "Break Rate:
Supply" is named to follow the model's convention; the term refers to the rate at
which broken aircraft become not mission capable for supply. This rate is
influenced by "Supply Effectiveness", the likelihood that a part is available
when needed. A value of 84% is used in the model, which agrees with findings
from Wolters (2000, p. 11). Fix rates are proportional to the gap between target
NMCS rates and actual NMCS rates. This formulation is consistent with Air
Force practice. According to F-16 program office personnel, management
attention is focused on parts problems when NMCS rates rise for a particular
item - in other words, a gap has opened between expected and actual
performance. The "B" encircled by an arrow indicates a balancing feedback
mechanism: the fix rate adjusts to meet demand. Another parameter that
influences the fix rate is the "Average Supply response time", which is 1 month
in the model and 29.8 days in reality (USAF 1999). This is the average time
needed for a part to go from the depot to the hands of a maintenance technician
at a base.
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Figure 26: Jets awaiting supply.
Interactions between jets awaiting supply and maintenance
The correlation analysis from section 4.3.1 showed that the number of aircraft
awaiting maintenance and awaiting parts was positively correlated. In the
model, shown in Figure 27, a causal relationship exists between the rate at
which aircraft await parts or maintenance. The relationship arises because
broken aircraft are first placed in the NMC Maintenance category. If repairs
require a part that is not available then the aircraft is declared NMC Supply.
Therefore each rate is linked to the overall rate at which aircraft break.
Another interaction between jets awaiting supply and maintenance arises
through the "Workload" parameter in the model. Workload represents the
amount of productivity required from aircraft maintainers at bases. It is
proportional to the sum of aircraft awaiting supply and maintenance. More jets
result in more work.
Workload is also linked to cannibalization, the practice of removing parts from
one aircraft and placing them on another. In the model the workload from
aircraft awaiting supply is multiplied by a term representing extra work
resulting from cannibalization. Aircraft awaiting supply cause cannibalization
to grow exponentially, a relationship demonstrated by the plot in Figure 28. The
exponential equation in the chart is used in the model and calibrated by a
constant so that the baseline case has a cannibalization multiplier of 1.
"Workload" influences "Morale and Retention" through a third-order
exponential delay with a 1-month time constant in the model (see Chapter 11 of
Sterman's book (2000) for a description of delays in system dynamics models).
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The arrow connecting Workload and Morale and Retention has two crossing
lines, which indicates the delay. Finally, Morale and Retention is linked with
"Maintainer Effectiveness", which is linked with maintenance and supply fix
rates in turn.
Morale and effectiveness are difficult concepts to model quantitatively. A
simplistic formulation is used in this model so that increasing workloads reduce
morale and effectiveness after some delay. Has the link between workload and
maintainer effectiveness been established? The title of a GAO report indicates
their findings on this subject: Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and
Maintenance Effectiveness (GAO 2001). The report states that "... one of the six
factors cited by military personnel as sources of dissatisfaction and reasons to
leave the military related to work circumstances such as the lack of parts and
materials to successfully complete daily job requirements" (p. 2). A lack of
parts leads to cannibalization, an increased workload, and dissatisfaction.
When maintenance personnel leave their replacements are typically less
experienced, thus low retention drives down the experience level of maintainers.
The ratio of experienced maintainers to inexperienced was highly correlated with
mission capability, according to Oliver (2001). Figure 29 shows that there is
strong correlation between this ratio and NMCS rates, also.
Dahlman describes how maintainer retention problems result in reduced
experience and effectiveness. Note that Air Force maintainers are classified as 3,
5, or 7-level, where 3 is an inexperienced maintainer and 7 is the most
experienced.
An ever younger force such as that shown in [the figure] is less
productive and requires more experienced trainers than a more mature
one... A major source of this problem is the retention rate of second-term
enlisted airmen... As greater numbers of these more senior 5-levels leave
the service, they are replaced by junior technicians who must take on a
greater share of the responsibility for maintaining and generating aircraft
as well as for training 3-levels (Dahlman 2002, p. 11).
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Evidence from Dahlman and the GAO shows that overworked maintainers may
become dissatisfied and leave the Air Force, resulting in reduced experience and
effectiveness for the maintainers who remain in the Air Force. This dynamic is
marked with arrows encircling an R in Figure 27, indicating reinforcing feedback.
A vicious cycle is formed where higher workloads reduce effectiveness and
cause workloads to grow even more.
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Figure 27: Interactions between jets awaiting maintenance and
supply.
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Figure 28: The relationship between F-16 cannibalization and F-16s
not available due to supply shortages (NMCS). Data source: GAO
(1999b, p. 7, 23).
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Figure 29:The ratio of apprentice Air Force maintainers (3-level) to
experienced (7-level) versus the rate of aircraft awaiting parts (NMCS
rate) from 1994-1998. Data source: (GAO 1999b, p. 7; Dahlman
2002, p. 9).
Limitations to the model
All models are wrong. Some models are useful.
- Anonymous
The complete model, built from each of the components described above, is
shown in Figure 30. This model was designed with a purpose: to offer an
explanation for the correlations between aircraft in the depot and aircraft
awaiting parts and maintenance (see section 4.3.1).
Two types of information characterize a model. The structure defines how parts
of the model interact, while parameters define the strength of the interactions.
The most significant weakness of the model is the parameters defining the
strength of interactions between break rates, fix rates, and other parts of the
model. The parameters are simply dimensionless constants that were selected
to produce the correlations shown in section 4.3.1. These constants can be
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thought of as highly aggregated estimates of operational parameters such as the
number of broken jets divided by the number of 3-level maintenance technicians.
The preferred way to build such a model would be to use data to calculate
interaction parameters. Such data was requested from the Air Force, but not
provided to the author. Using correlation data to choose parameters was
perhaps the next best alternative.
Since this model is dependent on the correlation analysis then it cannot
corroborate it. However, the model structure is supported by independent
evidence presented in this section, which does lend some credibility to the
results. Furthermore, the model was reviewed by four Air Force personnel from
the ALC with experience in F-16 sustainment and maintenance. They found the
model formulation to be credible and results to be interesting. One suggested
that the model could be used to calculate the marginal improvement in system
availability resulting from changes at the ALC.
Another weakness in the model is the simplistic relationship between workload,
morale and retention, and maintainer effectiveness. Evidence supports the
structural connection between these parameters, but the author does not have
data to calibrate the parameters individually. Indeed, such data may not exist.
Dahlman developed a comparatively sophisticated model of the relationship
between effectiveness and maintainer experience; Chapter 7 of his work
describes his model and its limitations (2002). A more robust and complicated
version of the author's model could add elements of Dahlman's model to better
determine the link between experience and effectiveness.
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Figure 30: A system dynamics model of Air Force F-16 sustainment.
Model test cases
The model in Figure 30 is used to test a nafve hypothesis: reducing the number
of depot-possessed aircraft from 10% of the fleet to 9% will result in system
availability rising 1%. In other words, all of the aircraft that left the depot
became available, and they are not absorbed into other categories of unavailable
aircraft. This case, called "Depot improvement", results in system availability
rising only 0.01% from the baseline case, much lower than the expected value of
1%. Figure 34 summarizes the results.
What happened to aircraft that left the depot? Most of them are awaiting parts
or maintenance because the number of maintainers and the supply of parts were
unchanged. Aircraft were shifted from the depot into the field, resulting in a
13% increase in workload for maintainers. Figure 31 shows how the aircraft
were shifted while the workload increased.
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Figure 31: Depot case: not mission capable aircraft and workload.
A third case called "Supply improvement" is tested in the model. This time the
supply effectiveness is increased from 84% to 86% while depot levels are left at
baseline levels. The overall change in system availability is a rise from 70% to
70.19%. The workload is significantly lower than the baseline case or the depot
improvement case. Cannibalization has been reduced since the number of
aircraft awaiting parts has dropped, and lower cannibalization rates result in
lower workloads for maintainers. However, the reduction in aircraft awaiting
supply is partially offset by a rise in aircraft awaiting maintenance.
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Figure 32: Supply case: not mission capable aircraft and workload.
The fourth case mixes improvements. Half of the depot improvement (depot
possessed rates drop from 10% to 9.5%) and half of the supply improvement
(supply effectiveness rises from 84% to 85%) are combined into one initiative. A
linear model would produce the sum of the independent initiatives: system
availability levels at 70.01% + 70.19% = 70.20%. The model gives a different
result: system availability rose to 70.39%, while the workload dropped slightly.
The distinction between this model and a linear model is an essential one: linear
models cannot account for feedback. Linear regression models can give an
indication of where to look for leverage, but only nonlinear models are capable
of characterizing and predicting feedback.
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Figure 34: Results from the
scenarios. Percentages are
70.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 1.00
70.01% 10.36% 10.63% 9.00% 1.13
70.19% 9.71% 10.09% 10.00% 0.93
70.39% 9.93% 10.18% 9.50% 0.99
system dynamics model under four
with respect to the total number of
aircraft.
This model illustrates how local optimization, such as improving depot
throughput without regard to the rest of the sustainment system, may not
result in the intended system-level benefits. Improvements to one part of the
sustainment system were largely absorbed by other parts of the system that
become overtaxed by the additional output from the improvement. A balanced
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approach produced better results by mitigating the complications arising from
increased performance.
Recommendations
Recommendations naturally emerge from a system model of operational
interactions. Here, the overall goal is to avoid burnout and low morale for base-
level maintenance technicians by balancing improvements in the depot with
reductions in aircraft awaiting parts. Without balance there is potential to do
long-term harm to the retention and experience levels of maintenance
technicians. Experience is lost quickly when skilled maintainers leave the Air
Force, but it is slow to build for new workers. Cannibalization rates, TNMCS
rates, and reenlistment rates for maintainers should be monitored in conjunction
with depot cycle time improvements.
Combining system models with cost information related to parts or
improvement initiatives results in a powerful capability for leaders at the ALC:
the ability to calculate the return on investment. The model can be used to
calculate the sensitivity of system availability (or other parameters) to policy
and performance changes. Leaders may compare the marginal rate of return for
various combinations of initiatives and choose the combination that maximizes
the change in system availability at a minimal cost.
A final case is used to illustrate the risk in uncoordinated improvements. Figure
35 shows the result when aircraft in the depot are reduced from 10% to 5%. In
this case the final system availability is 69.11% - the improvement at the depot
actually made overall availability worse. A glance at the workload shows how
this occurred. Workload nearly doubled due to cannibalization, resulting in
reduced maintenance effectiveness and increases in aircraft awaiting parts and
maintenance.
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Figure 35: A second depot case: not mission capable aircraft and
workload.
Recent trends in sustainment operations performance
More recent data seem to corroborate the model in terms of relationships
between mission capability, aircraft awaiting parts, and aircraft awaiting
maintenance. Figure 36 shows that F-16 mission capability has been steadily
increasing since the middle of 2003. This increase is associated with a
pronounced drop in aircraft awaiting parts (Figure 37) and a less pronounced
drop in aircraft awaiting maintenance (Figure 38). In the model the relationship
between capability rates and TNMCS is more direct than the relationship
between capability and NMCM because of the amplifying effects of TNMCS on
cannibalization and exponential increases in workload. A dditional data for the
number of depot-possessed aircraft would shed more light on these
relationships. Depot data was requested from the Air Force but not released.
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4.3.3 How has the Ogden depot maintenance
organization advanced improvement efforts?
The depot maintenance wing at the ALC is widely acknowledged as having
more experience and success with lean change efforts than other parts of the
ALC such as the supply organization. When asked about the disparity between
the depot and other parts of the ALC the depot wing leader attributed the gap
to three factors: 1) the nature of work performed within each organization, 2)
more spending flexibility within the maintenance wing, and 3) the maintenance
wing leadership's personal investment in lean and their willingness to take risks.
Each of these three factors fit neatly into a causal loop diagram of sustainable,
self-reinforcing process improvement developed by Keating (1999) and shown in
Figure 43 with minor modifications. Keating developed the diagram by
analyzing improvement efforts in numerous companies. The following sections
will describe each loop of the diagram.
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Employee Pull
The self-reinforcing loop labeled "employee pull" shown in Figure 39 is driven
by "employee perception of program value" resulting in "commitment to
improvement program" and greater "improvement results". Keating (1999)
found that the ability to sustain this feedback loop was a key differentiator
between failed improvement efforts and successful ones.
-timprovement'
results
Reinforcing:
+ "employee pull"
Commitment toEmployee ipmln
perceptionof improment
program value + gm
Figure 39: The "employee pull" loop.
Tougher challenges
A balancing loop called "tougher challenges" becomes stronger as easier
problems are solved. Initial improvement efforts tend to be directed at simple
problems. Harder problems of higher "organizational and technical
complexity" are tackled over time so that the "improvement half life" increases,
leading to less "improvement results".
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Figure 40: The "tougher challenges" loop.
Short tenure
The "short tenure" balancing loop, shown in Figure 41, is driven by the turnover
in leadership that tends to weaken leadership support for long-term process
improvement initiatives. Without leadership support the employee perception
of the improvement program value will be diminished. However, reinvestment
in the improvement program can mitigate this loss and improve employee
perceptions.
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Figure 41: The "short tenure" loop.
Diffuse benefits
When the benefits of improvement programs are intangible or distant the
commitment to the improvement program may suffer, according to the "diffuse
benefits" balancing loop. Problems with increasing organizational and technical
complexity tend to reduce tangible results.
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Figure 42: The "diffuse benefits" loop.
A comparison between the Depot Wing with other parts of the ALC
The complete causal loop diagram in Figure 43 shows that the depot
maintenance wing has two inherent advantages over other parts of the ALC.
There is greater tangibility and proximity of results, and there is greater
spending flexibility that allows reinvestment in improvements. Duplicating the
success of lean initiatives outside the depot maintenance organization will
require efforts that overcome the balancing loops that hinder self-sustaining
change.
In the depot the benefits of process improvements tend to be tangible and local.
Reductions in work-in-process result in more space for shop workers. One
technician said that a lean improvement effort in his shop caused other
technicians in neighboring shops to become interested in lean, even "jealous".
Improved working conditions and reduced inventory were easy to see.
Compare this with the supply organization, where the benefits from
improvements are less tangible. Improving supply effectiveness may help a
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technician at a base halfway around the globe, but that is difficult to appreciate
from the ALC.
Greater spending flexibility in the depot maintenance wing allows for the
savings from improvement efforts to be reinvested back into the improvement
process. According to the diagram, reinvestment improves the employee
perception of the program. Leadership support has a similar effect on
employee perceptions.
The "short tenure" balancing loop reduces leadership support for improvements
through leadership turnover. Indeed, turnover among military personnel at the
ALCs tends to be very high. A team of twelve leaders had an annualized
turnover rate of 67% over a nine-month period.
Recommendations
Several recommendations emerge naturally from the causal loop diagram. First,
the logistics organizations must find a way to reinvest savings from
improvements back into more improvements. Reinvestment may be feasible
under current regulations, according to several Air Force personnel from the
ALC. However, the logistics organizations have not yet developed the
capability to do so.
Second, the logistics organization needs to increase the tangibility and proximity
of results. One possible treatment comes from the Raytheon Paveway
production line where workers build laser-guided bombs. Pilots who use
Paveway in combat make yearly visits to the production line, and their
presentations are extremely popular and motivational for the production
workers. A similar effort at the ALC could involve pilots making presentations
about changes at the ALC that have improved their unit's effectiveness.
A third recommendation is that the negative effects of leadership turnover -
reduced support for long-term improvement initiatives - must be mitigated.
Institutionalizing change methods is one way to address this problem. Leaders
across the base would be expected to use the same set of improvement tools,
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not unlike Raytheon's company-wide implementation of Six Sigma. Raytheon
has institutionalized their improvement methods and set expectations that
leaders must abide.
Organizational
technical
and
compiuxuty
Leadership +
turnover
+ Balancing: A
Improvement "tougher Tangibilit
halt Its challenges" proxiit
result
eadership &.mprovement Balancing:
support reult "diffuse
Balancing: results benefits"
"short tenure"
Reinforcing:
+ "employee pull" +
EmployeeCommitment toEmployee Ipom
perceptionot program
pgr value+
Reinvestment
in program
and
y of
S
Figure 43: A causal loop diagram of improvement feedback.
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4.4 Analysis method comparison
One contention advanced in this thesis is that managing change by identifying
the right problem and (if it is a wicked mess) addressing it through systems
methods will produce better solutions than the current methods in use. This
contention will be supported by addressing three questions. Namely, when
compared with the improvement management methods in use, does a systems
approach...
1. ... lead to different conclusions?
2. Is it preferable?
3. How does the method influence the change process?
A number of recommendations were developed from systems modeling
methods in section 4.3. In general these recommendations focus on the
interactions between components of a system and how to manage them.
Particular attention is given to changes that allow or sustain reinforcing,
virtuous cycles of change while avoiding destructive vicious cycles. The
problem scope crosses organizations at the ALC to include logistics and depot
operations. Recommendations from the ALC focus on improvements that are
within the depot or the logistics organization. This observation leads to the first
question.
Do systems methods lead to different conclusions?
Conclusions from systems methods are different than conclusions resulting
from methods currently in use at the ALC. Consider two examples: one
system-method recommendation is to balance reductions in the depot cycle time
with reductions to TNMCS rates so that cannibalization and maintainer
turnover rates do not grow. Compare this recommendation with one from the
ALC: identify the top supply drivers of unavailable aircraft, then implement
lean initiatives in shops that produce those parts. The difference is in kind, not
in degree, which should not be surprising since the two approaches arise from
different worldviews on sustainment operations. Under the systems worldview
the interactions between parts of the system are treated as potential leverage
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points for driving improvement and mitigating negative feedback. Under the
ALC worldview the parts are treated individually so that top drivers of
unavailable aircraft become the focus of improvement efforts.
Are systems methods preferable?
System methods are fundamentally different than the methods in use at the
ALC. Therefore, assertions that one method is preferable will depend largely on
the context in which the methods are applied. Addressing another question
may be more illuminating: is there potential for a complementary relationship
between system methods and change methods at the ALC? Evidence suggests
that there is great potential for a complementary relationship in which system
methods are used to coordinate and prioritize change initiatives across
organizations.
Change agents at the ALC have proven their ability to improve operations at the
level of a shop or depot line. But these changes are not coordinated with a
system view that includes the effects of changes to other operations. System
models can provide such a view to ensure that improvement efforts are not
wasted or counteracted.
How do analysis methods influence the change process?
Analysis methods influence how the change process is executed at the ALC in a
critical way: the method effects how the problem is defined. System methods
emphasize the interactions between parts of a system and the continual testing
and expansion of problem boundaries. This focus frames the problem as one of
managing and exploiting interactions. Conversely, methods in use at the ALC,
which are rooted in manufacturing, are designed to control and improve
isolated processes. These methods emphasize a structured approach to finding
the root causes of reduced performance.
A recurring message in this thesis is that sustainment operations are a
complicated, highly interconnected system where searching for a single root
cause may be futile. System methods are designed to analyze such problems.
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Solving the right problem requires that our methods are matched to the
challenges we face. Solving the wrong problem might make matters worse, and
exhaust the resources for effecting change.
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5 Conclusions
Two overarching conclusions are drawn from this thesis. The first is that
changing the ALC is a problem of high dynamic and behavioral complexity.
Numerous examples from GAO reports, Air Force analyses, and the author's
analyses demonstrate that there is a high degree of interdependence along
behavioral and organizational dimensions. The second conclusion is that
system models are well suited to coordinating change at the ALC because they
provide insight into how a complicated system can be managed and improved.
Changing the ALC is a problem of high dynamic and behavioral
complexity
Three key findings support this conclusion. First, there is significant correlation
between categories of unavailable F-16 aircraft such that reductions in one
category are associated with increases in another. Second, an analysis of change
efforts in two parts of the ALC shows that systemic influences, such as the
inability to reinvest in improvements, are hindering change initiatives in one part
of the ALC. The third finding is that a model of sustainment operations
suggests that independent improvement initiatives are outperformed by
coordinated efforts driven with an understanding of systemic interactions.
System models are well suited to coordinating change at the ALC
Leaders throughout the sustainment community have expressed their desire to
understand how sustainment operations function as a system. A hybrid
approach to change is offered as a method for understanding and improving
sustainment operations. System models are used to quantify and model
system interactions; then policies and recommendations are drawn from the
models. Recommendations may include process-level improvements utilizing
change methods already in use at the ALC.
94
This page is intentionally blank.
95
Bibliography
Ackoff, Russel (1974). Redesigning the Future: A Systems Approach to Societal
Problems. New York, John Wiley and Sons.
Argyris, C. (1985). Strategy, Change, and Defensive Routines. Boston, Pitman.
Bickel, Robert W. (2003). Improving Air Force Purchasing and Supply
Management of Spare Parts. Rand Graduate School Dissertation.
Bozdogan, Kirk (2003). Measuring in the Face of Complexity: Insights on
Metrics from the Air Force Sustainment System. Hammer and Company
Conference, Cambridge, MA.
Brandt, Benjamin (2003). Barriers to Lean Enterprise Transformation: A Case
Study of the F-16 Avionics Sustainment System. Engineering Systems
Division thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Cahlink, George (2004). BRAC to the Future. Air Force Magazine. June.
Camm, Frank, Leslie Lewis (2003). Effective Treatment of Logistics Resource
Issues in the Air Force Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS) Process., RAND Project Air Force report.
CBO (2001). The Effects of Aging on the Costs of Operating and Maintaining
Military Equipment, Congressional Budget Office of the United States.
Christopherson, Tim, Alexis Stanke (2005). Lean Enterprise Transformation: A
Case Study at the Ogden Air Logistics Center. Lean Aerospace Initiative
Plenary Conference, March 2005.
Connor, Robert (2005). Enterprise Transformation: A View from the Trenches.
Lean Aerospace Initiaitve Plenary Conference.
CTPID (2004). "Air Force Air Logistics Center Takes Aim at Enterprise-Level
Lean." Impact: The Journal of the Center for Technology, Policy, and
Industrial Development at MIT Spring.
Dahlman, Carl J., Robert Kerchner, David E. Thaler (2002). Setting Requirements
for Maintenance Manpower in the U.S. Air Force. RAND report, Project
Air Force.
DoD (2000). Department of Defense Logistics Transformation, United States
Department of Defense. NDIA San Diego Conference, October 26.
DoD (2005). Base Realignment and Closure Report. Department of Defense,
May 2005.
96
Forrester, J. W. (1961). Industrial Dynamics. Cambridge, MIT Press.
GAO (1999a). Air Force Depot Maintenance: Management Changes Would
Improve Implementation of Reform Initiatives. GAO report
GAO/NSIAD-99-63.
GAO (1999b). Management Actions Create Spare Parts Shortages and
Operational Problems, General Accountability Office report
GAO/NSIAD/ AIMD-99-77.
GAO (2000). Air Force Depot Maintenance: Budgeting Difficulties and
Operational Inefficiencies, General Accountability Office report
GAO/AIMD/NSIAD-00-185.
GAO (2001). Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and Maintenance
Effectiveness, General Accountability Office report GAO-01-587.
GAO (2003a). Air Force Plans and Initiatives to Mitigate Spare Parts Shortages
Need Better Implementation, General Accountability Office report GAO-
03-706.
GAO (2003b). DoD Needs a Clear and Defined Process for Setting Aircraft
Availability Goals in the New Security Environment. General
Accountability Office report GAO-03-300.
GAO (2004). Air Force Depot Maintenance: Improved Pricing and Cost
Reduction Practices Needed, General Accountability Office report GAO-
04-498.
GlobalSecurity.org (2002). Hill AFB,
http:/ / www.globalsecurity.org/ military/facility/hill.htm.
Hardy, Sherel (2004). OO-ALC Commitment to F-16 Warfighters. Presentation
from the Ogden Air Logistics Center, October 6 2004.
Hemann, Justin (2004). "The Paveway Program Transformation." Lean
Aerospace Initiative Case Study, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Keating, Edward G., Frank Camm (2002). How Should the U.S. Air Force Depot
Maintenance Activity Group be Funded? RAND Project Air Force report.
Keating, Elizabeth, Rogelio Oliva, Nelson Repenning, Scott Rockart, John
Sterman (1999). "Overcoming the Improvement Paradox." European
Management Journal 17(2): 120-134.
Keller, Dr. Challon (2005). Personal communication: depot improvement data.
King, Jonathan (1993). "Learning to Solve The Right Problems: The Case of
Nuclear Power in America." Journal of Business Ethics 12: 105-116.
97
Kruger, Justin, David Dunning (1999). "Unskilled and Unaware of It: How
Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated
Self-Assessments." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 7 7(g):
1121-1134.
Murman, Earl, Thomas Allen, Kirkor Bozdogan, et al. (2002). Lean Enterprise
Value. New York, Palgrave.
Oliver, Captain Steven A., Lieutenant Colonel Alan W. Johnson, Major Edward
D. White III, Major Marvin A. Arostegui (2001). "Forecasting Readiness."
Air Force Journal of Logistics XXV(3): 3, 31-41.
Rittel, H. W. J., M.M. Webber (1973). "Dilemmas in a General Theory of
Planning." Policy Sciences 4: pp. 155-159.
Russell, Keith (2000). Reengineering Metrics Systems for Aircraft Sustainment
Teams: A Metrics Thermostat for Use in Strategic Priority Management.
Engineering Systems Division thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
Spear, Steven, Kent Bowen (1999). "Decoding the DNA of the Toyota
Production System." Harvard Business Review 77(5): 96.
Sterman, John (2000). Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a
Complex World, Irwin McGraw-Hill.
Thomas, Lewis (1974). The lives of a cell; notes of a biology watcher. New York,
Viking Press.
Tsuji, Luis (1999). Tradeoffs in Air Force Maintenance: Squadron Size,
Inventory Policy, and Cannibalization. Engineering Systems Division
thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
USAF (1999). Air Force Logistics Transformation Executive Level Briefing.
Acquisition and Logistics Reform Week, June 7-11.
USAF (2004). Business Diagnostics Assessment. Presentation from the Ogden
Air Logistics Center, May 27 2004.
USAF (2005). F-16 System Program Office Data. USAF Ogden Air Logistics
Center.
Wells, Thomas (2004). Air Force Materiel Command Reorganization. USAF
Presentation.
Wolters, James (2000). "Top-Level Characterization of the Air Force
Sustainment System Using a Systems Dynamics Model." MIT Lean
Sustainment Initiative White Paper WP-00-01.
98
